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ABSTRACT

This article explores the efforts of the international
community to battle corruption by focusing on the recently
promulgated Organization of Economic and Cooperative
Development (OECD) Convention on Combating Bribery of
in
International Business
Foreign Public Officials
Transactions. For many years the United States battled
corruption by prohibiting its domestic businessesfrom bribing
foreign officials. Other countries, however, generally viewed
U.S. policy as a form of unilateral commercial disarmament
and declined to pass their own anti-bribery legislation. The
Convention, therefore, marks a recent shift by the
international community, as it requires signatories to enact
laws to punish domestic corporations for bribes paid to
foreign officials.
The authors begin by examining the U.S. Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct (FCPA), the precursor to the OECD Convention,
and by describing all cases initiated by the government
pursuant to the FCPA. The authors then discuss
multinational anti-bribery efforts that ultimately led to the
adoption of the Convention. The article focuses on the
provisions of the Convention as well as the implementing
legislation of various signatories. Finally, the authors
explains compliance measures that multinational U.S.
corporations have adopted to protect themselves from FCPA

*

Partner, White & Case, Washington, D.C.

Associate, White & Case, Washington, D.C.
t The authors gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Amy Farrell in the
preparation of this article.
**

1249

1250

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:1249

violations and outlines measures that such corporations can
take to ensure compliance with implementing legislation
under the OECD Convention.
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The [OECD Convention] criminalizes the giving of bribes.
- World Trade, January 1999 at p. 581
Going in [to a developing] country you have to be ready to grease a few
palms.
- World Trade, Same Edition, Different Title, atp. 882

I. INTRODUCTION
thirty-four
outset of the new millennium,
At the
industrialized countries agreed to outlaw conduct that had
at many
operating procedure
previously been standard
multinational corporations by adopting the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (OECD Convention).3 Under the broadly
drafted Convention, the signatories 4 agreed to enact laws that

Skip Kaltenheuser, A Little Dab Wll Do You? The Movement to De1.
GreaseInternationalCommerce, WORLD TRADE, Jan. 1999, at 58, 58.
Richard Knee, Shipping to Africa: Weak Infrastructure and Culture
2.
Shock, WORLD TRADE, Jan. 1999, at 88 (quoting Kennan A. Brennan, president
and CEO of Phyto-Riker Pharmaceuticals Inc.). These two quotations from
different articles in the same edition of the same publication demonstrate a
dilemma inherent in contemporary international business.
3.
See Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997; S. TREATY Doc. No. 105-43,
at V (1998) [hereinafter OECD Convention on Bribery].
The twenty-nine members of the OECD are Australia, Austria, Belgium,
4.
Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary,
Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Korea, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United
Kingdom, and the United States. In addition to the member states, Argentina, Brazil,
Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak Republic signed the Convention. OECD Convention on
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would punish as criminal activity bribes paid by domestic
companies to foreign officials fors "improper advantage in the
conduct of international business."
For decades, the United States was effectively the sole
country to prohibit its national businesses from bribing foreign
officials. 6 Many overseas competitors were not disappointed to
see the high-minded United States engage in a commercial form
of unilateral disarmament. They viewed bribery as an integral
part of international business culture, 7 particularly in developing
countries, to be accepted as any other necessary evil. Some
countries even allowed bribes as legitimate income tax
deductions. Other competitors felt that, while admirable, U.S.
measures were not something they could afford to imitate in a
highly competitive global market. Still others took the view that
bribery was caused by demand from the payee-not the payor-

and that prevention of bribes in foreign developing countries was
the responsibility of authorities in those countries.
In this atmosphere of ambivalence, the policy shift of the
signatories to the OECD Convention took many companies by
surprise, multilateralizing a dilemma that corporate America has
faced for years. That is, a company may lose a major foreign
contract unless it pays the "right person," yet that payment may
violate applicable anti-corruption laws. The two quotations at the
beginning of this article, taken from different articles in the same
publication, provide a telling illustration of the contradictory
forces now impelling business decisions.
How great a threat anti-bribery compliance poses to business
relationships remains unclear. 8 For example, it is debatable how

Combating Bribery to Enter into Force on 15 February 1999, (visited Oct. 26, 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org/news.andevents/release/nw98-124a.htm>.
OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3, art. 1(1).
5.
This prohibition is embodied in the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 15
6.
U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-1 to -2, 78ff (1994), as amended by International AntiBribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 3302.
7.
The view that corruption is systemic and unavoidable is not uniquely
held by overseas competitors, however. For example, the recent Olympics bribery
scandal provided a forum for domestic cynicism to be voiced as well. See, e.g.,
Michael Wilbon, In Olympics, Bribery Is a ParticipationSport, WASH. POST, Feb. 11,
1999, at Dl:
I'm sorry that I'm having so much trouble working up indignation over the
escalating scandal involving the International Olympic Committee
members and, oh, every city that's hosted the Olympics since Zeus won
the gold medal in the decathlon. . . . [Bjribery is as big a part of the
Olympics as track and field.
U.S. officials have alleged that between May 1994 and April 1998
8.
bribes influenced 239 international contract competitions in which the sum value
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much U.S. business has materially suffered from U.S. bans on
bribes to foreign officials or whether these prohibitions have
created more efficient and better-organized enterprises. 9 What is
clear, however, is the magnitude of the risk assumed by a violator
of anti-bribery law. Using the U.S. regime as a template, an
individual faces, per unlawful payment, a fine of $2 million and
incarceration for five years. Given these sanctions, the expansion
of criminal punishment throughout the developed world has
seized the attention of more than one multinational executive.
Recognizing that companies and individuals involved in
international business for the first time may be "damned" if they
do not comply with the OECD Convention and applicable
implementing legislation, this article focuses on how to abide, in
a practical sense, by both the letter and spirit of these new laws.
Multinational corporations must ensure that they act to protect
themselves from inadvertent and intentional violations of antibribery law by their agents.
This article, in Part II, will first describe the precursor to the
OECD Convention, the U.S. anti-bribery regime, the U.S. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA), as it is currently enforced by the
U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC). This section also summarizes the
facts and disposition of all cases initiated pursuant to the FCPA.
Part III then discusses the global efforts to combat bribery
that preceded the OECD Convention and analyzes the provisions
of the OECD Convention itself. This section also compares the
implementing legislation of various signatories to the OECD

of the contracts at stake totaled $108 billion. See Glenn R. Simpson, Foreign
Deals Rely on Bribes, U.S. Contends, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 1999, at A3. However,
no statistics in the public record support the notion that the FCPA has
substantially hindered the overseas business endeavors of U.S. companies. See
Daniel Pines, Comment, Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act to Include a
Private Right of Action, 82 CAL. L. REV. 185, 208 (1994).
9.
For example, the president of United Technologies Corporation fired
the president of a foreign subsidiary for making gifts to foreign officials in violation
of the FCPA. After the firing, he observed:
Market share and profitability stayed up and even increased and, after a
year or two of tenacious effort, we were able to shorten our long, long
overdue collection period on government receivables in one of the more
notorious problem countries. Those early experiences taught me that the
only way to run our business is with the most rigorous and demanding
standards of compliance with law and regulations.
Quoted in Benjamin B. Klubes & Roberto Iraola, The Foreign CorruptPractices Act:
A Compliance Primerfor American Businesses in an Era of Trade Globalization, 1
FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTIcES AcT REP. (Business Laws) [hereinafter FCPA Rep.]

105.001, 105.007 n.7 (1998).
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Convention, and sets out the future prospects of the OECD
Convention and its progeny.
measures that
Lastly, Part IV surveys compliance
to protect
adopted
have
corporations
multinational U.S.
then
section
This
FCPA.
themselves from violations of the
to
assure
take
can
companies
enumerates steps that non-U.S.
their compliance with applicable implementing legislation under

the OECD Convention.
II.

LEADING THE WAY-U.S. EFFORTS TO CURB BRIBERY

Since the enactment in 1977 of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), U.S. businesses have faced criminal penalties if they
engaged in business-related bribery of foreign public officials.
Foreign competitors, however, did not have similar restrictions and
could engage in this corrupt activity without fear of penalty.
0
-William Jefferson Clinton'

A. The Statutory Framework

1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act

a. Origins
In the mid-1970s, it was revealed that U.S. corporations were
11
making potentially illegitimate payments to foreign officials.
Allegations of questionable transactions were not confined to
insignificant businesses or minor officials in obscure countries.
Rather, the public became aware that corporate giants like
Exxon, Gulf, Mobil, and Lockheed had made payments to
presidents, prime ministers, and royalty of major trading
partners.

12

Statement on Signing the International Anti-Bribery and Fair
10.
Competition Act of 1998, 34 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOc. 2290 (Nov. 10, 1998).
See, e.g., Robert M. Smith, Simon Criticizes Lockheed for Obscurity on
11.
Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 1975, at 1.
See Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To Be Done
12.
With The ForeignCorrupt PracticesActP, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 433 (1987).
When the FCPA was enacted, the governments of Japan, Italy, and the
Netherlands had recently been destabilized by the implication of their officials in
various bribery schemes. See id. True to its nature, history has come full circleall three countries are signatories to the OECD Convention.
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The media exposure surrounding apparent bribes of foreign
officials catalyzed the creation of a voluntary disclosure program
by the SEC under which the SEC agreed that enforcement
actions would not target corporations that disclosed past
payments and created internal anti-bribery procedures.' 3 The
SEC's voluntary program opened the disclosure floodgates. Over
400 companies, 117 of which were Fortune 500 companies,

voluntarily disclosed substantial bribes. 1 4 Hearings were held, I5
an anti-bribery

bill was introduced

and passed with little

debate, 1 6 and President Carter signed the FCPA into law in

late

1977.17 Until last November, the FCPA had been amended only

18
once, in 1988, to provide two affirmative defenses.

b. Anti-Bribery Provisions
The FCPA is divided into two discrete areas of application,
the anti-bribery provisions and the accounting provisions. The
anti-bribery provisions make it unlawful for any issuer or
domestic concern
to make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment,
promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or
offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving of anything
of value to
(1) any foreign official...

13.
See Hearingson Activities of American Multinational CorporationsAbroad
Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Economics Policy of the House Comm. on Int'l Relations,
94th Cong. 57, 63-64, 66 (1975) (statement of Philip Lommis, Jr., Commissioner,
Securities and Exchange Commission); see also SEC Offers Amnesty in Corporate
Payoffs, BUS. WK., Aug. 4, 1975, at 20; Note, Disclosure of Payments to Foreign
Government Officials Under the SecuritiesActs, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1848 (1976).
14.
H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977). See generally SUMMARY: U.S.
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF U.S.
BUSINESS, REPORTTo CONGRESS (1981).
15.
See ProhibitingBribes to Foreign Officials: Hearings on S. 3133, S. 3379
and S. 3418 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing and UrbanAffairs, 94th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1976); Unlawful CorporatePayments: Hearingson H.R. 3815 and
H.R. 1602 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer Protection and Finance of the House
Comm. on Interstateand ForeignComm., 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
16.
Julia Christine Bliss & Gregory J. Spak, The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act of 1988: Clarificationor EviscerationP,20 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 441, 445-46 &
n.23 (1989) (noting that only four pages of the Congressional Record covered the
House debate).
17.
Foreign Corrupt Practices and Investment Disclosure Bill: Statement
on Signing S. 305 Into Law, [1977] PUB. PAPERS 2157 (Dec. 20, 1977).
18.
Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418,
§ 5003, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415 (amending 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1). See generally Bliss
& Spak, supranote 16.
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(2) any foreign political party or official thereof or any
candidate for foreign political office for purposes of(A)(i) influencing any act or decision of such party, official, or
candidate in its or his official capacity,
(ii) inducing such party, official, or candidate to do or omit to
do any act in violation of the lawful duty of such party,
official, or candidate, or
(iii) securing any improper advantage; or
(B) inducing such party, official, or candidate to use its or his
influence with a foreign government or instrumentality
thereof to affect or influence any act or decision of such
government or instrumentality
in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business for
19
or with, or directing business to, any person.

Stated simply, it is a federal crime for any U.S. person or entity to
offer or to pay, either directly or through an intermediary,
anything of value to a foreign government official in order to gain
an improper commercial advantage in obtaining or retaining
business.
i. Coverage
The FCPA's anti-bribery provisions apply to persons or
entities subject to U.S. jurisdiction who knowingly participate in a
prohibited transaction. Specifically, these provisions apply to any
"issuer" of securities registered with the SEC, as well as to any
officer, director, employee, agent, or stockholder acting on behalf
of the issuer.2 0 They apply with equal force to U.S. persons and
entities designated as "domestic concerns." 2 ' The anti-bribery
provisions do not apply directly to foreign persons, that is,
natural persons who are not citizens, nationals, or residents of
the United States, or to foreign entities that are not SEC-

19.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a)(1) to -1(a)(2) (1994), as amended by International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, § 2, 112 Stat.
3302, 3302.
20.
Id. at § 78dd-l(a, as amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, § 2, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302.
21.
Id. at § 78dd-2(a), as amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair
Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, § 3, 112 Stat. 3302, 3304. A
"domestic concern" is:
(1)(A) a citizen, national, or resident of the United States; and
(B) any corporation, partnership, association, joint-stock company,
business trust, unincorporated organization, or sole proprietorship which
has its principal place of business in the United States, or which is
organized under the laws of a State of the United States or a territory,
possession, or commonwealth of the United States.
Id. § 78dd-2(h)(1).
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registered.2 2 If they are otherwise subject to U.S. jurisdiction,
however, such foreign persons and entities can face liability for
knowingly assisting a U.S. person or entity in making an
improper payment. 2 3
Furthermore, while the anti-bribery
provisions do not apply to foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of
U.S. corporations, a U.S. parent can face liability for knowing
participation
in improper payments made by a foreign
24
subsidiary.

ii. Violations
The FCPA prohibits payments that are made corruptly with
the intent to influence any act or decision of a foreign official or to
induce an official to do or refrain from doing any act in violation
of the lawful duty of an official. 25 The FCPA is violated even if an
official does not select the course of action preferred by the
person making the bribe, so long as the briber possesses the
26
requisite intent to wrongfully influence a recipient's actions.
The FCPA defines "foreign official" broadly to include any officer
or employee of a foreign government or "instrumentality" of the
government, which is generally understood to include officers and
employees of a commercial enterprise owned by a foreign
government. 2 7 The definition of "foreign official" was broadened

22.

See id. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (defining "domestic concern").

23.

See Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 440

(D.D.C. 1992).
24.
The FCPA is strictly limited in application to SEC-registered "issuers"
and domestic concerns. See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1994), as
amended by International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-306, 112 Stat. 3302. See also Department of Justice, Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct Antibribery Provisions (visited Oct. 27, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/dojdoc/htm>. ("A foreign-incorporated subsidiary of a U.S.
firm will not be subject to the FCPA, but its U.S. parent may be liable if it
authorizes, directs, or participates in the activity in question.").
25.
15 U.S.C. §9 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (1994), as amended by International

Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, §§ 2-3, 112
Stat. 3302, 3302, 3304.
26.
United States v. Arthur, 544 F.2d 730, 734 (4th Cir. 1976).
27.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(f)(1), 78dd-2(h)(2) (1994), as amended by
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306,
§ 2, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-03. Support for this interpretation of "foreign official" is
provided by the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which defines "instrumentality
of a foreign state" as any enterprise in which a foreign state is a majority owner.
28 U.S.C. § 1603(a)-(b) (1994).
Notwithstanding the breadth of the FCPA
definition of "foreign official," it frequently is difficult to determine if an individual
is a foreign official in formerly totalitarian states such as Russia where the
government once owned and managed every facet of the national economy. See
Christopher F. Dugan & Vladimir Lechtman, Current Development: The FCPA in
Russia and Other FormerCommunist Countries, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 378, 382 (1997).
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further by the 1998 FCPA amendments to include any officer or
employee of an international organization as defined by executive
order.2 8 The FCPA prohibits the payment of money or anything
29
else of value such as gifts or valuables.
The clearest form of a violation of the anti-bribery provisions
occurs when a U.S. corporation pays a sum of money to foreign
government officials to induce them to award a government
contract to the U.S. corporation. In all instances, the basis for a
violation is an improper quid pro quo: a U.S. person gives
something of value to a foreign official-no matter how
indirectly-expecting the official to use her position for the
commercial benefit of the U.S. person. 30
ii.

Indirect Bribery

The anti-bribery provisions explicitly prohibit payments made
directly to a foreign government official, as well as payments
made to an intermediary while "knowing" that all or some of the
payment will be passed on improperly to a foreign government
official. 3 1 A company is considered to have knowledge of a
payment if it is aware of a "high probability" that the payment will
3
be made and consciously disregards that probability.

FCPA issues

frequently arise when

a

2

U.S. corporation

employs a marketing representative or sales agent in a foreign
country. If the marketing representative pays a bribe to a foreign
government official, the U.S. corporation may be required to
demonstrate that it did not retain the marketing representative

28.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(2)(B) (1994).
29.
See id. §§ 78dd-l(a, 78dd-2(a), as amended by International AntiBribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, §§ 2-3, 112 Stat.
3302, 3302-05.
30.
See Arthur, 544 F.2d at 735. One of the 1998 amendments to the
FCPA outlawed payments made with the intent to acquire "any improper
advantage." International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-366, §§ 2(a)(1), 3(a)(1), 4, 112 Stat. 3302. It is unclear how such broad
language will be applied by enforcement authorities, but it appears that the
provision was enacted with the intent that the FCPA ban payments made to
foreign officials for any reason, be they transactional or otherwise. For example,
assume the following set of facts: (1) an American industrialist is taken hostage in
a foreign country; (2) it is federal policy that money will not be traded for hostages;
(3) the American corporation makes a payment to a foreign official in exchange for
the industrialist's release. Has the corporation violated the FCPA by making a
payment to a foreign official for an improper purpose? Much of the ambiguity
inheres in "advantage," which is undefined by the FCPA.
31.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (1994), as amended by
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306,
§§ 2-3, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-05.
32.
Id. §§ 78dd-l(q(2)(B), 78dd-2(h)(3)(B).
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"knowing" that she would pay a bribe to a foreign government
official. The legislative history of the FCPA makes clear the
33
drafters' intent to eliminate any "head-in-the-sand" problem.
One report explicitly states that "knowledge" covers "both
prohibited actions that are taken with 'actual knowledge' of
intended results as well as other actions that ... evidence a
conscious
disregard or deliberate ignorance
of known
circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high
34
probability of violations of the Act."
iv. Joint Ventures
Joint ventures may present special concerns under the FCPA
where one of the parties to the venture is a foreign official (or
someone close to an official), a state-controlled company, or a
company controlled by a foreign official. 35 Even if the identity of
joint venture partners does not pose a risk of FCPA violationsthat is, they are not "foreign officials" or the like-the actions of
those partners may create a liability risk. Although some joint
venture partners may not be subject to the FCPA, they may
nonetheless trigger FCPA liability in the same fashion as a U.S.
agent or consultant if the U.S. partner authorizes the foreign
partner's actions or otherwise satisfies the "knowledge"
requirement. 3 6 Indeed, it may be simpler to satisfy the

33.
H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 920 (1988), reprintedin 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1949, 1953. See infra notes 219-29 and accompanying text (discussing United
States v. F.G. Mason Eng'g, 3 FCPA Rep. 698.70 (D. Conn. 1990) in which a guilty
plea was entered where company chose to "avoid learning" about misconduct); see
also Proceedings of the Seventh Annual Conference on Legal Aspects of Doing
Business in Latin America: Adapting to a ChangingLegal Environment, 9 FLA. J. INT'L
L. 1, 40 (1994) (presentation of Clyde McFarland entitled Recent Developments:
FranchisingAgency, Licensing, DistributionLaw, and Related Matters).
34.
H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 920 (1988).
35.
It is no simple task to determine whether or not a person is a "foreign
official," especially in those countries deemed "big emerging markets," or "BEMs,"
by the Commerce Department. The list of ten BEMs includes Mexico, Brazil, the
People's Republic of China, India, and Indonesia. While these rapidly expanding
markets hold great opportunity for international investment, several are viewed as
being among the world's most corrupt. See, e.g., Asia Corrupt-O-Meter, FORTUNE,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 26. It is likely, then, that OECD Convention entanglements will
arise involving transactions in the BEMs. See, e.g., ITA's Outgoing Garten Callsfor
Anti-Bribery Campaign,Focus on BEMs, DAILY REP. FOR ExECUTIVES, Oct. 17, 1995,
at A-8; SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.471 (D.D.C. 1997) (FCPA
violation involving joint venture with Indonesian company).
36.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (1994), as amended by
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306,
§§ 2-3, 112 Stat. 3302, 3302-05.
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"knowledge" requirement in the context of a shared enterprise
than in an agency relationship.
v. Conspiracy
Sometimes, crucial eidence for the prosecution is situated in
a country that is unfriendly to the U.S. government.
Nevertheless, a defendant cannot relax once government
prosecutors realize they cannot obtain relevant foreign evidence.
Charges of conspiracy to violate the FCPA are often attached to
indictments for alleged acts that directly violate the FCPA, and
conspiracy is often the crime for which a defendant ultimately is
convicted.3 7 Because a U.S. enforcement agency can prove a

case for conspiracy by demonstrating the existence of a mere
agreement to violate the FCPA and one act in furtherance of that
agreement, it can prosecute and convict defendants in cases in
38
which it cannot prove all elements of a classic FCPA violation.
vi. Exceptions
Legitimate reasons exist for giving money or something else
of value to a foreign government official. Two examples are lawful
political contributions and payments for bona fide services
rendered by an official outside of her official capacity. If an
official receiving a payment is in a position to abuse her office to
benefit the payor, however, the payment would receive special
scrutiny under the FCPA.
Despite the existence of certain legitimate payments, the
anti-bribery provisions are subject to only one statutory
exception, which is applied in limited circumstances. The FCPA
permits "facilitating or expediting payments" to foreign
government employees "to expedite or to secure the performance
of a routine governmental" function. 3 9 Routine governmental
functions include the following: obtaining licenses, permits, or
visas; processing work orders; providing police protection, mail

37.
See, e.g., infra Part II.B. 1 (discussing cases such as United States v.
Mead, United States v. Tannenbaum, United States v. Lockheed, United States v.
Steindler, United States v. F.G. Mason Eng'g, United States v. Pou, United States
v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., and United States v. Napco Int'l, all of which involved

charges of conspiracy to violate the FCPA).
38.
See cases cited supra note 37 (plea to conspiracy to violate FCPA
resulting in every case where charge of conspiracy was made).

39.

15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b) (1994).
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delivery, or phone and water service; and scheduling inspections
related to contract performance or the transit of goods. 4 0
vii. Defenses

41

The FCPA also provides for two affirmative defenses. That is,
a payment is justified if it (1) is legal under the laws of a foreign
official's country4 2 or (2) represents reimbursement of reasonable
expenses incurred by a foreign official in connection with the
demonstration of products or services. 43 The burden is on the

defendant to show that a payment fits within one of these narrow
44

categories.
To meet its burden under the first affirnative defense, a
defendant must show that the payment in question was
permitted under the written law of the foreign country, which
often proves to be a complex endeavor. 45 In difficult cases,
however, the legality of a payment under foreign law may be
demonstrated by a foreign statute or regulation, the issuance of
an advisory opinion by a foreign government agency, the issuance
of regulations by a unit of local government, or a course of

40.
Id. §§78dd-l(f)(3)(A), 78dd-2(h(4)(A), as amended by International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, § 3, 112 Stat.
3302, 3304-05.
41.
While the FCPA provides two affirmative defenses to allegations of
bribery, the statute as a whole was recently-and creatively-based as an
affirmative defense against a breach of contract claim. ISMES, S.p.A. v. Murphy &
Assocs. involved a contract dispute between a U.S. company and an Italian
company, which was majority-owned by the Italian government.
Under the
contract, the U.S. company agreed to pay a commission to the Italian company for
sales to a Russian government-owned joint venture. When the U.S. company was
not permitted to share its commissions with the Italian company, it created a
consulting agreement with the Italian company on the side. However, when the
U.S. company learned that the Italian company intended to share its commission
with the Russian joint venture, it canceled all commission payments. The breach
of contract action followed.
The U.S. company argued that performance of the contract would have
violated the FCPA's bribery provisions, making the contract illegal and
unenforceable. Although the argument did not lead to a favorable jury decision,
the defensive use of the FCPA in a civil action is noteworthy.
42.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-i(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1) (1994).
43.
Id. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2).
44.
See LEONARD B. SAND ET AL., 4 MODERN FEDERAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS:
CIVIL
73.01, at 73-2 (1998) (stating civil litigation burden of proof jury
instruction as follows: "[Tlhe burden is upon the defendant to establish the
affirmative defense"); see also Department of Justice, supra note 24 ("because

these defenses are 'affirmative defenses,' the defendant would be required to show
. I . that the [travel or entertainment] payment met these requirements. The
prosecution would not bear the burden of demonstrating in the first instance that
the payments did not constitute this type of payment.").
45.
See Department of Justice, supra note 24.

1999]

GLOBALIZATION OFANTI-BRIBERY MEASURES

1263

conduct of a foreign government or government agency indicating
46
that the payment is legal.
The second defense permits the payment of non-excessive

travel and entertainment expenses of foreign officials to learn
about or to be trained by host U.S. companies. 4 7 The key to a
payment being covered by this defense is the "non-excessive"
aspect of the payment. Thus, if travel or entertainment expenses
are overly lavish, the defense does not apply. Because of the
factual nature of any analysis under this defense, the DOJ has
issued several Advisory Opinions in response to inquiries about
48
the propriety of various payments made to foreign officials.
viii. Penalties
The FCPA imposes harsh penalties for violations of the antibribery provisions. A corporation or an individual acting for
49
herself may be subject to fines of $2 million for each violation.
The FCPA states that an individual acting on behalf of a
corporation is subject to fines of up to $100,000 and
imprisonment of up to five years for each violation.5 0 However,
under other federal law, fines for individual violators may be
increased to $250,000,91 or, if the violator has derived a
pecuniary gain or created a pecuniary loss from the violation,
fines may total twice the value of the gain or loss.5 2 Applicable
sentencing guidelines may increase jail time for white collar

46.
The DOJ lists the foregoing methods as demonstrative of legality in a
foreign jurisdiction but suggests that parties planning to justify payments to
foreign officials under the auspices of this affirmative defense either seek the

advice of counsel or utilize the DOJ's Advisory Opinion procedure. See id. Even if

a party obtains an opinion from foreign counsel that a payment is not explicitly
outlawed, that opinion is not per se exculpatory. A defendant also must show
that the payment was proper under the written law or regulation of the foreign
jurisdiction. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(1) (1994); H.R. CONF. REP.
No. 100-576, at 922 (1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1949, 1955
(emphasizing requirement that legality of payment must be based on written law).
47.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-i(c)(2), §§ 78dd-2(c)(1).
48.

See Department of Justice, Review Procedure Release Nos. 81-02, 82-

01, 83-02, 83-03, 85-01, 92-01 <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
revindx.htm>.
49.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(A) (1994), as amended by International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, § 3, 112 Stat.
3302, 3304-05.
50.
See id. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), as amended by International Anti-Bribery and
Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, § 3, 112 Stat. 3302, 3304-05.
51.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(3) (1994).
52.
See id. § 3571(d).
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defendants. 5 3 In addition, civil penalties of up to $10,000 can be
imposed on either a corporation or an individual.5 4 A conviction
under the FCPA may result in additional, supplemental penalties
under other laws.5 5
The statute of limitations under the FCPA is five years for
criminal actions 5 6 and civil actions.5 7 When the DOJ must
obtain evidence from foreign countries, however, the period in
criminal actions may run for an additional three years once a
request to a foreign country is filed with the federal court.5 8
ix. Advisory Opinions
If a U.S. person or entity is contemplating prospective
conduct that raises issues under the anti-bribery provisions, the
FCPA permits the person or entity to request an opinion from the
DOJ as to whether the conduct would constitute a violation
under the DOJ's present enforcement policy.5 9 The DOJ, which
enforces the anti-bribery provisions, is required to provide its
opinion within thirty days of receiving the request. 60 If the DOJ
opines that the prospective conduct would not constitute a
violation of the anti-bribery provisions, the opinion creates a
rebuttable presumption that the conduct is lawful. 6 1
c. Accounting Provisions
The FCPA amended the Securities Exchange Act (SEA) of
193462 to incorporate certain record-keeping requirements into
the SEA. 63 The accounting provisions impose strict requirements

on publicly-held U.S. corporations to

53.
See UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, GUIDELINES MANUAL,
§ 8C2.5 (Nov. 1995) (high-level status of corporate officer increases culpability).
54.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(1)(B), -2(g)(2)(C), as amended by International
Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-306, § 3, 112 Stat.
3302, 3304-05.
55.
These collateral sanctions are discussed infra, Part II.A.2.
56,
See 18 U.S.C. § 3282 (1994).
57.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2462 (1994).
58.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3292(a)(1), (2)(c)(1) (1994).
59.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(e), 78dd-2(f} (1994).
60.
See id. §§ 78dd-1(e)(1), 78dd-2(fq (1994).
61.
See id. §§ 78dd-1(e)(1), 78dd-2()(1). The DOJ opinion procedure is
found at 28 C.F.R. pt, 80.
62.
S. REP. No. 95-114, at 1 (1977), reprintedin 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4098-99.
S63.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1994).
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(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer; and
(B) advise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's
... authorization,
(ii) transactions are recorded . . . in conformity with generally
accepted accounting principles...
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's... authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is the existing assets
at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with
64
respect to any differences.

These requirements generally were intended to prohibit the
65
use of "off-the-books" slush funds used to pay foreign officials
and were already part of the generally accepted accounting
principles

in

the United

States.6

6

The accounting provisions

require issuers (1) to make and keep books and records "which,
in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions
and dispositions of assets of the issuer,"6 7 and (2) to "devise and
maintain a system of internal accounting controls" that provides

"reasonable assurances" that transactions are authorized.6 s
While designed specifically to deter or expose improper
payments to foreign government officials, these provisions have
much broader applicability. The provisions apply to transactions
that are wholly domestic in nature and that have nothing
69
whatsoever to do with bribery.
To date, the FCPA's accounting provisions have had little
practical effect. The SEC, which has principal responsibility for
civil enforcement of the provisions, has treated them as an
afterthought, alleging violations only as an additional theory
when proceeding against a person or entity for more substantive
wrongdoing under the securities laws. 70 The DOJ, which has

64.
Id.
65.
See SECURITIES AND EXcHANGE COMM'N REPORT, 94TH CONG., 2ND SESS.,
REPORT ON QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 23, 24
(Comm. Print 1976).
66.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(B)(ii) (1994).
67.
Id. § 78mb)(2)(A).
68.
Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).
69.
See also United States v. Crop Growers Corp., 954 F. Supp. 335, 356
(D.D.C. 1997) (relying on 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) in non-FCPA context). See, e.g.,
United States v. Joyce, 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 2289, at *3 (10th Cir. 1997)
(describing plea to violation of 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) in non-FCPA context).
70.
See, e.g., In re Playboy Enterprises, Inc., Securities Exchange Act
Release No. 17059, 1980 SEC LEXIS 911 (Aug. 13, 1980). In Playboy, the SEC
alleged that perquisites provided to Hugh Hefner were not properly disclosed in
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responsibility for the criminal enforcement of the accounting
provisions, generally alleges violations of these provisions only
71
when pursuing violations of the anti-bribery provisions.
The civil and criminal penalties applicable to the FCPA
accounting provisions are the same as those that apply to all
other violations of the SEA. Criminal penalties are available only
for "knowing" violations of the accounting provisions, such as
deliberate circumvention of a company's internal accounting
72
controls or knowing falsification of company books and records.
The penalties for accounting violations are arranged in three
"tiers." In the first tier, the penalty may equal the greater of
$5000 for a natural person or $50,000 for any other person, or
the gross amount of pecuniary gain realized by a defendant as a
The second tier applies when the
result of the violation. 73
violation involves "fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or
reckless disregard of a regulatory requirement," and the
maximum penalty increases to $50,000 for a natural person or
$250,000 for any other person. 74 The third tier applies if, in
addition to fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless
disregard of a regulatory requirement, the violation also "directly
or indirectly results in substantial losses or created a significant
risk of substantial losses to other persons."7 5 The maximum
for a
penalty for a third-tier violation increases to $100,000
76
natural person and $500,000 for any other person.
2. Gap-Filler Statutes
Several other U.S. anti-bribery statutes supplement the
FCPA's foreign application by focusing on bribes paid to domestic
public officials and private sector persons.

proxy statements and the SEC Form 10-K. See id. at *33-39. The SEC also
appended a claim that Playboy had inadequate systems of control and approval
and incomplete recordkeeping. See id. at *39-46. Absent the FCPA claim, the
SEC still would have brought the action based solely on the proxy statement and
Form 10K allegations. However, since there was evidence to support an FCPA
claim, it was asserted as well.
See, e.g., United States v. Lockheed Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.175 (N.D.
71.
Ga. 1994); United States v. Steindler, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.131 (S.D. Ohio 1994);
United States v. Harris Corp., 2 FCPA Rep. 698.95 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (DOJ antibribery enforcement actions that included accounting provision charges). Each of
these cases is discussed in more detail infra at Part II.B.1.
72.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4) (1994).

73.

§ 78u(d)(3)(B)(i).
See id.

74.

Id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(ii).

75.

Id. § 78u(d)(3)(B)(iii).

76.

See id.
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77
a. Federal Bribery Statute

The Federal Bribery Statute makes it a crime to corruptly
give, offer, or promise anything of value to any U.S. public official
or person selected to be a public official with the intent to
influence any official act.7 8 Because the federal bribery statute
applies only to federal public officials, all fifty states have enacted
79
statutes prohibiting bribery of state and local public officials.
"Public official" includes members of Congress and
employees of the federal government, whether appointed or
elected,8 0 but does not include former officials. 8 1 Also included
are private persons responsible for carrying out a federal program
under governmental authority on behalf of the
or policy who act
82
United States.
Giving anything of value, such as goods, services, or
promises of future business or employment, can constitute a
bribe under the Federal Bribery Statute.8 3 To be found liable, a
defendant must have made the payment in exchange for a

specific decision or other action. 84 If the payor gives the bribe
with the requisite intent, it does not matter that the official is not
influenced by the bribe or that the official does not have the
authority to bring about the payor's desired result.8 5
Possible penalties for Federal Bribery Statute violations
include a prison term of fifteen years, fines valued at three times
the amount of the bribe, or both.8 6 Additionally, a public official
who violates the bribery statute may be disqualified from holding
87
any office of "honor, trust, or profit under the United States."

77.
78.
79.
statute.

See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (1994).
See id. § 20 1(b).
The California and New York statutes exemplify the typical state
See CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 67-68 (West 1999), N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 200.00,

200.30 (McKinney 1999).
80.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(a)(i)-(2) (1994).
81.
See United States v. Hipkins, 756 F. Supp. 233, 236-38 (D. Md. 1991).
See Dixson v. United States, 465 U.S. 482, 496 (1984).
82.
83.

2 F. LEE BAILEY & HENRY B. ROTHBLATT, DEFENDING BUSINESS AND WHITE

COLLAR CRIMES § 21:9 (2nd ed. 1984); see also United States v. Rasco, 853 F.2d
501, 505 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 959 (1988) (bribery element met by
proof of an ability and a desire to pay a bribe).
84.
2 KATHLEEN F. BRcKEY, CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY, § 9:31, at 297-98
(2d ed. 1984).
See United States v. Kurzban, 703 F. Supp. 5, 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
85.
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1994).
86.
87.
Id.
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b. False Statements Statutes8
Under the False Statements Statute, it is a crime to
"knowingly and willfully falsify], conceal[], or cover[] up by any
trick, scheme or device a material fact, or makej] any false,
fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations."8 9 A
"statement" may consist of a claim or a document that relates to
a subject within the jurisdiction of any department or agency, 90
whether or not the person making the statement realizes it. 9 1 In
the commercial bribery context, the False Statements Statute is
used either to punish false claims that no illegal payments were
made or to punish the submission of false accounting records
92
that hide acts of bribery.
For purposes of the statute, a statement or representation is
"material" if it could affect or influence a government function. 93
There is no statutory requirement that the government agency
actually rely upon, or be influenced by, the statement. 9 4 The
statement must be false at the time it is made, 95 and the person
making the statement must be aware that the statement is false
or misleading or must have consciously avoided determining the
96
truthfulness of the statement.
Violators of the False Statements Statute may be
incarcerated for five years per false statement.9 7 In addition, an
individual may be fined $250,000; if pecuniary gain or loss
resulted from the false statement, the individual may be fined
twice the gain or loss. 98

88.
See id. § 1001.
89.
Id.
90.
See id.
91.
Any department or agency of the three branches of the federal
government qualifies as a "department or agency" for subject matter jurisdiction
purposes under the False Statements Statute. See United States v. Bramblett,
348 U.S. 503, 509 (1955).
92.
See, e.g., United States v. Blandford, 33 F.3d 685, 704-06 (6th Cir.
1994) (upholding conviction based on false statements made by a state legislator
regarding his acceptance of bribes).
93.
See United States v. corsino, 812 F.2d 26, 30 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting
United States v. Markham, 537 F.2d 187, 196 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1041 (1977)).
94.
See United States v. Diaz, 690 F.2d 1352, 1357-58 (11 th Cir. 1982).
95.
See 3 BRIcKEY, supranote 84, § 13:16 at 278.
96.
6 ARKIN & RAKOFF, BUSINESS CRIME IJ 35.03 (1991).
97.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1994).

98.

The False Statements Statute prescribes any fines that may be

imposed under Title 18. See id. § 1001(1994).
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c. Commercial Bribery Coverage
Commercial bribery occurs when payment is made to a
private-sector employee or official with the intent to influence her
conduct regarding her employer's affairs. 9 9 Giving and receiving
such bribes is prohibited.
Although there is no single federal statute prohibiting

commercial bribery, the Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes,1 0 0 the
Bank Bribery Act,1 0 1 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act (RICO)' 0 2 all provide penalties for commercial
bribery. Additionally, many states prohibit commercial bribery
103
through their own enactments.
i. Mail Fraud' 0 4 and Wire Fraud Statutes

0 5

The mail and wire fraud statutes make it a crime to
participate in a scheme to defraud or to obtain money or property
by means of false pretenses, representations, or promises effected
through the United States mail or interstate wire, radio, or
television communications.' 0 6
The commercial bribery laws
generally prohibit a person from conferring or agreeing to confer a
benefit upon an employee, agent, or fiduciary without the consent
of that person's employer, ff such benefit is intended to influence
0 7
the employee's conduct with respect to the employer's affairs.'
These laws are based on the belief that the employer is the victim
of a fraud when the employee has used her position to obtain
illegal benefits in exchange for making or influencing certain

99.
See REV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.295 (Michie 1997).
100.
The mail fraud statute is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and the wire
fraud statute is at 18 U.S.C. § 1343.
101.
18 U.S.C. § 215 (1994).

102.

Id. §§ 1961-68 (1994).

103.

See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-11-120 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 11.46.670

(Lexis 1998); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 708-880 (Michie 1999); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
5/29A-1 (West 1993); IOWA CODE ANN. § 722.10 (West 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 214405 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14.73 (1999); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-10
(1994); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-613 (1995); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.295 (Michie
1997); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 180.00, 180.05 (McKinney 1999); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-12-08 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs § 22-43-1 (Michie 1998).
104.
18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
105.
Id. § 1343.
106.
See id. §§ 1341, 1343.
107.
See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 180.00 (McKinney 1999).
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decisions affecting the employer's business.' 0 8 To violate these
statutes one must intend specifically to participate in the scheme
and must use mail, wire, radio, or television services to carry out
or promote the illegal activity.' 0 9
A violator of the commercial bribery statutes may be fined,
imprisoned for up to five years, or both. 110 If the violation affects
and
a financial institution, fines may be increased to $1 million
111
the term of imprisonment may be extended to thirty years.
These statutes can play a particularly important anti-bribery

role in cases in which out-of-country payments are legal under

2
the FCPA because they were not made to a "foreign official.""
For example, in the 1970s the DOJ used the mail and wire fraud
statutes to prosecute acts that now are classic FCPA
violations. 1 13 In one case, the DOJ obtained indictments under
the wire fraud statute for bribes of foreign government officials to
approve computer purchases. 1 14 In another case, indictments
were obtained under the wire fraud statute for bribes of foreign
officials in exchange for their approval of applications for work
permits for expatriates. 1 15 Thus, collateral to the FCPA regime,
the wire and fraud statutes may criminalize the bribery of foreign
1 16
private persons.

108. See, e.g., United States v. Reece, 614 F.2d 1259, 1261 (10th Cir. 1980)
(depriving an employer of loyal service by participation in a kickback scheme
constitutes fraud under the mail fraud statute).
109.
MARVIN G. PICKHOILZ ET AL., GUIDE TO WHITE COLLAR CRIME 7 (1986).
110. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (1994).
111. See id.§§ 1341, 1343.
112. They also may be enforceable against foreign subsidiaries that may not
be subject to the FCPA. See Dooley v. United Technologies Corp., 803 F. Supp.
428, 439 (D.D.C. 1992).
113. William F. Pendergast, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: An Overview of
Almost Twenty Years of Foreign Bribery Prosecutions, 1 FCPA REP. 102.001,
102.018 n.4 (1998).
114. United States v. Control Data Corp., Criminal No. 78-210 (D.D.C. Apr.
26, 1978) (information and plea agreement filed same day) (information, notice of
plea agreement, and plea agreement on file with authors).
115. United States v. The Williams Cos., Criminal No. 78-144 (D.D.C. March
24, 1978) (information and plea agreement filed same day) (information, notice of
plea agreement, and plea agreement on file with authors).

116.

See, e.g., United States v. Van Cauwenberghe, 827 F.2d 424 (9th Cir.

1987). In Van Cauwenberghe,the United States indicted and extradited a Belgian
on grounds that he had violated the wire fraud statute in connection with a
Van
scheme to defraud a Belgian corporation and investment broker.
Cauwenberghe demonstrates that the wire fraud statute may create jurisdiction
over schemes to defraud-or bribe-private foreign persons. See also United
States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996) ("Federal wire prosecutions have
been based on frauds against private foreign and individuals."); Christopher
M. Curran, Beyond the FCPA: The Federal Mail and Wire Fraud Statutes May
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ii. Bank Bribery Statute1 1 7
The bank bribery statute makes it illegal for any officer,
director, employee, agent, or attorney of any financial institution

connected with the federal banking system to solicit, accept, or
agree to receive anything of value if the person giving the gift
intends it as a reward for business dealings with the financial
institution." 8 The extent of the penalties for violating the statute
depends on the value of the gift. If the gift is worth less than
$1000, the recipient may be ordered to pay a fine of $1000, to
serve a full year in prison, or both." 9 For giving a gift worth
more than $1000, a person may be fined the greater of $1 million
or three times the value of the gift, sentenced to a prison term of
120
thirty years, or both.
iii. RICO
RICO prohibits a person from engaging in a "pattern" of
racketeering activity consisting of two or more violations of
certain crimes listed in the statute, 12 1 including bribery, mail
fraud, or wire fraud. 12 2 In fact, at least one court has found
conduct violating the FCPA as a Travel Act violation, which is a
RICO predicate crime.1 23 The criminal penalties for briberyrelated RICO violations include imprisonment of up to twenty
years and forfeiture of all proceeds and property derived from the
24
racketeering activity. 1
Notwithstanding the lack of a private right of action under
the FCPA, 12 5 RICO also provides a private cause of action for
treble damages, the elements of which may be met by FCPA-

ProhibitForeign Bribery in Circumstances When the FCPA Does Not (on file with
author).
117.

18 U.S.C. § 215 (1994).
118.
See id. § 215(a).
119.
See id.
120.
See id.
121.
See id. §§ 1961(5), 1962 (1994).
122.
See id. § 1961.
123.
See United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334, 338-39
(D. Conn. 1990).
124.
See 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1994).
125.
See Lamb v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 915 F.2d 1024 (6th Cir. 1990)
(affirming dismissal of private FCPA action for failure to state a claim), cert.
denied, 498 U.S. 1086 (1991); see also Lewis v. Sporck, 612 F. Supp. 1316, 1333
(D.C. Cal. 1985) (FCPA accounting provisions do not imply private right of action).
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violative conduct. 12 6 Thus, a private RICO action could be
wielded as a business weapon by an envious party alleging that a
competitor's bribery of a foreign official enabled the competitor to
27

win a foreign contract. 1

3. Collateral Sanctions
As if the mammoth fines and lengthy terms of incarceration
imposed by the FCPA and similar laws provide inadequate
punishment, convicted violators-or those simply alleged to have
violated the FCPA-may suffer a number of additional sanctions.
FCPA defendants can be barred from participation in
procurement by federal government agencies. 128
A mere
29
indictment for an FCPA violation is grounds for suspension,'
and once an agency bars or suspends a company from
nonprocurement or procurement activities, other agencies in turn
must exclude the company. 130 Additionally, companies that
violate the FCPA may be prevented from receiving State
Department export licenses, and, if under indictment, they can be
barred from receiving licenses until they receive a full-fledged
acquittal. 13 1 Other programs from which FCPA violators can be
barred or suspended include those of the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation 13 2 and the Commodity Futures Trading
Commission. 13 3 Furthermore, the Department of Commerce will
not provide advocacy assistance on foreign government
procurement projects to corporate violators of the FCPA, who may
13 4
also be excluded from participating in trade missions.

126.
See, e.g., Environmental Tectonics v. W.S. Kirkpatrick, Inc., 847 F.2d
1052, 1063 (3rd Cir. 1988), affd, 493 U.S. 400 (1990).
127.
For more speculation about federal criminal statutes that might apply
in the context of foreign bribery, see generally Don Zarin, Other U.S. Laws
Applicable to Overseas Bribery, in DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT

PRACTICES ACT 11-1 (1995).
128.
See 48 C.F.R. § 4.602-2(a)(3) (1998).
129.
See 48 C.F.R. § 9.405-2(a) (1998); see generally Non-procurement
Debarment and Suspension, 53 Fed. Reg. 19,161 (1988).
130.
See 48 C.F.R. § 9.405(a) (1998).
131.
22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1(b), 120.24().
132.
See 22 C.F.R. § 709. l(b) (1999).
133.
See 17 C.F.R. §§ 3.55, 3.60 (1998).
134.
These collateral sanctions target corporations, but foreign countries are
also monitored by the United States. The Uruguay Round Agreements Act
requires the President to report to Congress those countries that fall to effectively
prohibit bribery in connection with government procurement if the United States
acquires products from those countries in significant amounts.
19 U.S.C.
§ 2515(d) (1994). As a result, the Office of the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) has requested comments for the preparation of at least one such report.
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B. The FCPA at Work
Bland statutory recitals shed little light on how the FCPA
works in real life. Explication of the facts and dispositions of
various FCPA cases reveals, at least in part, how corporations
become entangled in the FCPA, how the DOJ and SEC apply the
With the
law, and how violations eventually are resolved.

preceding statutory summary as introduction, the following case
summaries address DOJ prosecutions under the anti-bribery
provisions of the FCPA as well as SEC enforcement actions under
the Act's accounting provisions.
13
1. DOJ Anti-Bribery Prosecutions

13
a. Brazil Nuts

5

6

Control System Specialists, Incorporated and its president
allegedly violated the FCPA, the federal bribery statute and the
federal conspiracy statute.' 3 7 Specifically, the DOJ charged that
the defendants, who purchased, repaired, and resold surplus
military equipment, conspired with a U.S. Air Force employee and
The
a Brazilian Air Force officer to violate the FCPA. 13 8
defendants made payments to the U.S. Air Force employee to

See, e.g., Request for Comments Concerning Foreign Government Discrimination
in Procurement, 61 Fed. Reg. 5044 (1996). Furthermore, in the past few years,
the USTR has considered governmental indifference to corruption to be a trade
barrier worth noting in its annual report on foreign trade practices. See Request
for Public Comment with Respect to the Annual National Trade Estimate Report
on Foreign Trade Barriers, 63 Fed. Reg. 59,619 (1998); Request for Public
Comment with Respect to the Annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign
Trade Barriers, 62 Fed. Reg. 59,014 (1997); Request for Public Comment with
Respect to the Annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers,
61 Fed. Reg. 56,081 (1996); Request for Public Comment with Respect to the
Annual National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers, 60 Fed. Reg.
55,614 (1995).
135.
Because many FCPA bribery prosecutions end in plea agreements
between the DOJ and the accused parties, few published judicial opinions exist.
Thus, most of the cases described below are not reported in the Federal Reporter
series and are identified by the docket numbers assigned them by the federal
Where available, the Federal Reporter citation is provided.
district courts.
Because the number of anti-bribery cases is small, all actions brought during the
past ten years are summarized. The cases are organized in reverse chronological
order.
United States v. Control Sys. Specialists, Inc., 4 FCPA Rep. 699.587
136.
(S.D. Ohio 1998).
137.
See id. at 699.587-.590.
138.
See id. at 699.588-.589.
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steer surplus military equipment to them. 139 The defendants
then refurbished the equipment and sold it to the Brazilian
Aeronautical Commission.140 The defendants also formed a
sham company that made "consultant fees" payments to the
Brazilian Air Force Officer.' 4 ' In reality, the "consultant fees"
were illegal payments made in exchange for the officer's influence
with the Brazilian government.14 2
The defendants each waived formal indictment and pleaded
guilty to all counts.' 43 Under the plea agreement, the company
president potentially faced seven years in prison and a $250,000
on each count, and he agreed to make full restitution of any
damages caused by the criminal acts. 14 The company faced a
fine of $500,000 on each count and also agreed to make full
restitution. 14 5 Ultimately, the president was sentenced to three
years of probation and 150 hours of community service. 14 6 The
company received a $1500 fine and one year of probation.' 4 7
48
b. Oil Slick'

The DOJ recently charged Saybolt, Incorporated (Saybolt), a
petroleum inspection company, and Saybolt North America, Inc.,
both subsidiaries of a Dutch company, with violating the FCPA's
anti-bribery provisions.' 4 9 Specifically, the DOJ claimed that
Saybolt's president and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and
Saybolt's chairman jointly authorized a $50,000 payment to
Panamanian government officials upon their request. 150
According to the information, the payment was made to the
Panamanian Minister of Mines and Materials in a Panama City
bar.' 5 ' In return for the payments, Saybolt received government
contracts for a Panamanian Saybolt affiliate, a lease of prime real

139.
140.

See id. at 699.588.
See id.

141.

Id. at 699.589.

142.
143.
144.

See id.
See id,at 699.591, 699.595.
See id.at 699.591.

145.

See id. at 699.595.

146.

See 1 FCPA Rep. 101.034.

147.
See id.
148.
United States v. Mead, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.533 (D.N.J. 1998).
149.
See Department of Justice, Press Release: Saybolt Inc. Agrees to Plead
Guilty to FalsifyingReports to the EPA and Violating the ForeignCorruptPracticesAct
and to Pay a Fine of $4.9 Million (Aug. 18, 1998) <http://wvv.usdoj.gov/usao/
ma/pr/prev98/sayblt.htm> [hereinafter Saybolt Agrees to Plead Guilty].
150.
See Mead, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.539.
151.
See id. at 699.533.
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estate bordering the Panama Canal, and expedited tax
52
advantages. 1
Saybolt's president, a British citizen with U.S. resident alien
status, was arrested and charged with violating the FCPA,
The
conspiring to violate the FCPA, and racketeering.15 3
chairman of the board of directors, a Dutch national and
resident, was indicted in absentia on identical charges. 154 He
remained a fugitive at the time of the disposition. 1 55
Saybolt and Saybolt North America pleaded guilty to violating
and conspiring to violate the FCPA. 1 56 Pursuant to the plea
agreement, the companies were fined $4.9 million, received five
years of probation, and agreed to cooperate in the investigation
57
and prosecution of the individuals involved. '
The Saybolt case is notable for several reasons. For one, it
signals a new initiation process for FCPA cases. Violations of the
FCPA are generally brought to the attention of authorities by
whistleblowers or disgruntled former employees. In this case,
however, the FCPA violations were discovered in the course of an
unrelated criminal investigation pursuant to environmental
Second, the case demonstrates how severe FCPA
laws.' 5 8
penalties can be in relation to the size of the violations. Here, a
$50,000 bribe resulted in a $1.5 million fine to the corporation.
Third, the chairman of Saybolt's board appears to be the first
non-resident foreign national to be indicted for violating the
FCPA.
This jurisdictional expansion was justified by the
chairman's positions of authority in two U.S. corporations.
Finally, the nature of the DOJ's evidence demonstrates the
means by which modem business communications technology
can create a damning paper trail that previously was unavailable
to prosecutors. In alleging the conspiracy, the indictment quoted
extensively from numerous, explicit electronic mail and telefax
transmissions describing the negotiations and decisionmaking
surrounding the $50,000 bribe.' 5 9 In the past, much of this
evidence would not have existed because it would have been
conveyed orally instead of being communicated electronically.

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.

See id. at 699.536-.537.
See id. at 699.540.
See Saybolt Agree to Plead Guilty, supra note 149.
See id.
See id.
Only $1.5 million of the fine was delegated to the FCPA charges. The

rest of the fine resulted from falsification of petroleum test data in violation of the
Clean Air Act. See id.
158.
159.

See id.
See Mead, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.539.
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1 60
c. Garbage In, Garbage Out

The president of Tanner Management and certain unnamed
co-conspirators were accused of conspiring to violate the
FCPA. 16 1 In particular, they were accused of offering to make
payments of between $120,000 and $200,000 to an undercover
agent posing as an Argentine procurement officer. 16 2 The offer of
payments was intended to induce the false procurement officer to
purchase garbage incinerators for the government of Argentina.
To disguise the offered payments, the president of Tanner
Management opened a bank account for a non-existent business
163
entity.
The president pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to
Pursuant to the Federal Sentencing
violate the FCPA. 16 4
him eligible for twelve to eighteen
Guidelines, his plea made
5
months of incarceration. 16
d. Plane Dealers

16 6

The DOJ accused Lockheed Corporation (Lockheed) of
making a $1 million payment to a business operated by a
member of the People's Assembly of the Arab Republic of
Egypt.16 7 The payment allegedly was made with an intent to
cause the official to help Lockheed win an aircraft sales contract
with the government of Egypt.16 8 The charges resulted from an
investigation conducted by special agents of the Defense Criminal
Investigative Service and the Defense Contract Audit Agency in
connection with loan financing administered by the U.S. Defense
69
Department.1
According to the charging documents, Lockheed entered a
consulting agreement with the Egyptian official before she
The official
became a member of the People's Assembly. 170
received a monthly retainer for "devot[ing] her best efforts to the
development of markets and sales prospects" for Lockheed in

160.
161.
162.
163.

United States v. Tannenbaum, 4 FCPA Rep. 699.583 (S.D.N.Y. 1998).
See id. at 699.586.
See id. at 699.584.
See id. at 699.587.

164.
165.

See id. at 699.584.
See id. at 699.585.

166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

United States v. Lockheed Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.175 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
See id. at 699.179.
See id. at 699.178.
See id. at 699.176-.177.
See id. at 699.177.
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Egypt. 17 1 She also was to receive a commission based on the
number of planes Lockheed sold in Egypt. 172 When the official
later was elected to the People's Assembly, Lockheed's regional
vice president prepared documents transferring the consulting
agreement to the official's husband; Lockheed, however,
173
continued to pay the Assembly member a monthly retainer.
The government of Egypt purchased the aircraft from
Lockheed using financing it obtained from a program
administered by the U.S. Defense Security Assistance Agency
(DSAA).1 7 4 Lockheed falsely certified to the DSAA that it had not

made any bribes, rebates, gifts, kickbacks, or gratuities in
exchange for favorable treatment. 175 Further, the sales contract
between Lockheed and the government of Egypt attested that the
contract price did not include a sales commission, and that if
price
Lockheed had in fact paid a sales commission, the contract
1 76
would be reduced by the amount of that commission.
Later, when the U.S. financing agency announced that it
intended to notify the Egyptian government that Lockheed paid a
commission on the sale, the official prepared a letter forfeiting the
The Lockheed regional vice president then
commission. 1 77
prepared a document indicating that the company would no
longer pay a commission for the sale.' 78 Lockheed ultimately
paid the official a "termination fee" equal to the value of the lost
commission but claimed that the payment was unrelated to the
Lockheed eventually admitted that the
sale of aircraft. 179
payment was not a termination fee but rather a payment to the
Egyptian government official in exchange for her assistance in
obtaining the aircraft sales contract for Lockheed.18 0
In addition to the charges leveled at Lockheed, the DOJ
individually accused Lockheed's Director of Middle East and
North African sales of falsely certifying to the DSAA that the
termination fee paid to the Egyptian official was not connected to
the sale of aircraft and of arranging the transfer of funds from
Lockheed to the official.' 8 ' It also accused the regional vice

171.
172.

Id.
See id.

173.
174.

See id. at 699.178.
See id. at 699.182.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

See id. at 699.181.
See id. at 699.178.
See id. at 699.181-.182.
See id. at 699.182.
See id. at 699.183.
See id. at 699.176.
See United States v. Love, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.187 (N.D. Ga. 1995).
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president of executing the Termination Agreement with the official
and arranging for the delivery of the termination fee to her Swiss
bank account.
Lockheed eventually pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate
the anti-bribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA by
making improper payments and falsifying records, and agreed to
pay a $24.8 million fine.' 8 2 Additionally, the Director of Middle
East and North African sales for Lockheed Aeronautical pleaded
guilty to creating a false document relating to the payment of a
bribe and received a sentence of three years of probation.18 3 The
officer was fined $20,000 and was barred from working on
defense contracts for a period of three years. The regional vice
president of Lockheed International also pleaded guilty to
violating the FCPA, was fined $125,000, and was sentenced to an
18 4
eighteen month term of imprisonment.
e. Spilled Milk' 8 5
Vitusa Corporation (Vitusa) contracted to sell powdered milk
to the government of the Dominican Republic. 18 6 After Vitusa
made three deliveries of powdered milk, the government failed to
pay its bill in full. The president of Vitusa unsuccessfully
contacted numerous U.S. and Dominican government officials
seeking their assistance in obtaining payment for the powdered
milk. 18 7 A local Dominican government official informed a Vitusa
business agent that he would use his influence to encourage the
government to pay the outstanding balance to Vitusa in exchange
for a "service fee."'3

8

The president of Vitusa discussed the "service fee" with a
U.S. embassy official who informed him that the payment would
violate the FCPA. Despite this warning, the president decided to
pay the fee and notified the embassy official by facsimile that he
had already made his decision. When the Dominican government
made a payment on the powdered milk contract, Vitusa arranged
for part of the payment to be placed in the bank account of its

182.

See Lockheed Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.186.

183,

See Love, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.188-.189.

184.
See 1 FCPA Rep. 101.019.
185.
United States v. Vitusa Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.155 (D.N.J. 1994);
United States v. Herzberg, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.165 (D.N.J. 1994).
186.
See Vitusa Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.159.
187.
See id. at 699.160.
188.
See id. at 699.159.
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business agent, knowing that its agent would forward the money
to the Dominican government official.' 8 9
Vitusa, and its president individually, both pleaded guilty to
a single count of making an unlawful payment to a foreign official
in violation of the FCPA.' 9 ° The company was fined $20,000,
while the president was fined $5000 and sentenced to probation
for two years.' 9 ' The president's cooperation with prosecutors
was a mitigating factor that prevented him from receiving more
92
severe punishment.'
i
f. Jet Setters 93

General Electric (GE) contracted with the Israeli Government
to provide tools, equipment, testing facilities and training to
maintain GE engines used in Israeli jet fighters. In turn, GE
subcontracted the work to an Israeli firm. 19 4 Instead of paying
the subcontractor directly, GE made payments to the Israeli
subcontractor's U.S. sales agent. The sales agent then diverted a
portion of the funds to European bank accounts established for
sales manager and an Israeli Air Force
the GE international
95
general.'
The Israeli government later contracted to purchase seventyfive new jet engines from GE. Israel financed the purchase and
the earlier service contract through the U.S. Foreign Military
Financing Program, which is administered by the DSAA. The
DSAA required GE and the Israeli government to provide
certifications that the borrowed funds were being used
19 6
properly.
The GE international sales manager and the Israeli general

represented that GE, through its Israeli subcontractor, would
provide funding for the testing of the new engines even though
the Israeli Air Force conducted the engine tests independent of
any GE funding. The international sales manager then instructed
the subcontractor to bill GE for the testing. GE paid the Israeli
subcontractor pursuant to the bill, and, like the funds derived
from the service contract, the sales funds were diverted to bank

189.

See id. at 699.164

190.
191.

See id. at 699.155; Herzberg, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.166.
See 1 FCPA Rep. 101.018.

192.

See 3 FCPA Rep. 699.166.

193.
194.
195.
196.

United States v. Steindler, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.131 (S.D. Ohio 1994).
See id. at 699.131.
See id. at 699.133.
See id. at 699.132.
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accounts maintained for the benefit of the GE international sales
197
manager and the Israeli general.
The international sales manager signed a contractor
certification, which was ultimately provided to the DSAA, in
which he falsely stated that the contract for the sale of jet engines
did not contain any undisclosed agreements or improper
payments. 198 The international sales manager also made false
statements on GE questionnaires regarding his outside business
interests and falsely stated that he would comply with GE policies
prohibiting transactions like those in which he was engaged. 19 9
The DOJ charged the international sales manager with
bribing a general in the Israeli Air Force. 20 0 The international
sales manager pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA,
wire fraud, and money laundering.2 0 ' He was sentenced to seven
years of imprisonment and ordered to forfeit almost $1.8
million. 20 2 The general was convicted in Israel on related charges
20 3
and sentenced to thirteen years in prison.
GE was charged with violating the False Claims Act and with
fraud and money laundering.2 0 4 Under its plea agreement with
the DOJ, the company paid $59.5 million in civil fines and $9.5
million in criminal penalties.2 0 5 A General Electric employee who
exposed the company's misconduct received a $13.5 million
20 6
reward under a federal "whistle blower" statute.
20 7
g. Down the Stretch They Come

American Totalisator Company (ATC) was accused of making
payments to its Greek business agent "knowing that all or a
portion" of those payments would be forwarded to a Greek official
in violation of the FCPA. In exchange for the payments, the
official allegedly assisted ATC in obtaining and retaining business
with the Greek Horse Racing Administration. 20 8
The DOJ
brought an action for a permanent injunction against ATC, and

197.
See id. at 699.134.
198.
See id.
199.
See id. at 699.136.
200.
See id. at 699.152-.153.
201.
See 1 FCPA Rep. 101.017.
202.
See id.
203.
See id.
204.
See Steindler, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.147-.151.
205.
Whistle-blower Gets $13 Million, CHICAGO TRIB., Dec. 5, 1992, at 10.
206.
See id.
207.
United States v. American Totalisator Co., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.067 (D.
Md. 1993).
208.
See id. at 699.068.
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ATC consented to a final judgment, entered by the district court,
in which ATC was permanently enjoined and restrained from
violating the FCPA, and in which it agreed to cooperate fully with
a DOJ criminal investigation of the matter.20 9 The DOJ declined
to pursue criminal prosecution of ATC, presumably as a result of
2 10
ATC's cooperation as well as a lack of evidence.
h. Just the Fax 2 1 1
The Harris Corporation (Harris) employed a consultant for
the purpose of securing telecommunications business with
Telecom, a telecommunications company controlled by the
government of Colombia.
The DOJ alleged that part of the
commissions paid to Harris's consultant were forwarded to a
member of the Colombian legislature in exchange for his
influence in securing contracts with Telecom, in violation of the
FCPA. Harris allegedly also paid commissions to a Colombian
company, knowing that the company was partly owned by a
member of the Colombian legislature. Commissions paid to the
company were tied to the value of contracts Harris received from
the Colombian government, and the DOJ alleged that the
commissions were payments for the legislator's assistance to
Harris in obtaining and maintaining telecommunications
business with Colombia. 2 12 The DOJ also charged that Harris
violated the FCPA's accounting provisions by failing to maintain
records and accounts that accurately reflected the transactions
and dispositions of its assets. 2 13
Specifically, the illegal
commission payments allegedly were falsely described as
"consultant retainer fees," "consultant expenses," and "incidental
2 14
fees" to conceal their true nature.
According to the indictment, the vice president and the
director of administration of Harris both knew when they hired
the consultant that he had "an in" with the government of
Colombia. 21 5 After the consultant was hired, he sent the vice
president a fax indicating that he would not travel to Colombia
unless he had $5500 in cash. The vice president forwarded this
fax to the director of administration. At some point the director of

209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

See id. at 699.071-.072.
See id. at 699.070-.073.
United States v. Harris Corp., 2 FCPA Rep. 698.95 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
See id. at 698.97.
See id. at 698.97-.98.
Id. at 698.97.
Id. at 698.98.
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administration made a notation of a phone call with the
consultant in which he indicated that the $5500 was for a bribe,
2 16
and the director later signed a check request for the money.
On a separate occasion the director of administration and the
vice president submitted a check request for the consultant,
which included $3000 in "incidental fees."2 1 7
The trial court dismissed the charges against Harris and the
named officers after assessing the evidence presented at trial by
the DOJ as insufficient to sustain a conviction under the
2 18
FCPA.
i. Spy vs. Spy 2 19
F.G. Mason Engineering (Mason) and its president both
admitted to paying kickbacks to a German official in order to
secure and retain business with the German Military Intelligence
Service. 22 0 The German official was responsible for the selection,
procurement, and testing of electronic surveillance equipment for
the Military Intelligence Service and other agencies of the German
government. 2 2 1
In exchange for his influence in securing
business for Mason, the German official received kickbacks
representing thirteen percent of the payments Mason received
from procurement contracts. A written agreement executed by
the parties indicated that the payments were to be made in
exchange for the German official's consulting services. 2 2 2 The
agreement provided that the company would continue to pay
223
commissions to the official's family in the event of his death.
Mason's president allegedly knew the agreement and
payments to the German official were illegal, but he "consciously
chose to avoid learning of the specific provisions of law that
prohibited this conduct."2 2 4
Although the German official
provided some minor technical assistance to the company,
Mason's president recognized that the commissions were paid for

216.
217.
218.
219.

See id.
See id. at 698.99.
See 1 FCPA Rep. 101.016.
United States v. F.G. Mason Eng'g Inc., 2 FCPA Rep. 698.70 (D. Conn.

1990).
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.

See id. at 698.82-.86.
See id. at 698.70.
See id. at 698.71.
See id.
Id. at 698.83.
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influence with the German military, not for legitimate business
2 25
advice.
Mason and its president both pleaded guilty to conspiring to
violate the FCPA by making the payments to the German
official. 226 As part of the plea agreement, the president
cooperated in the prosecution of the German official in
Germany. 22 7
Mason and its president were sentenced to
probation for five years and jointly were ordered to pay a $75,000
fine. 22 8 Because Mason had an ongoing contractual relationship
with the German government at the time the plea agreement was
executed, it was ordered to make restitution by giving the
government a $160,000 credit toward existing contracts and
22 9
discounts on future purchases of equipment or services.
2 30
j. Bus Fuss

A business agent for Eagle Bus Manufacturing (Eagle) met
with the president and vice president of the Saskatchewan
Transportation Company (STC), a government-owned Canadian
corporation, to negotiate a contract for the sale of eleven buses.
At the meeting, STC officers told Eagle's agent that a $50,000
(Can.) payment was a prerequisite to their approval of the
contract. The president and vice president of Eagle allegedly
approved the payment, and Eagle's vice president traveled to
Canada with the business agent to meet with the STC officers and
23 1
to finalize the method of payment.
At the direction of its officers, the STC proffered a check to
Eagle's agent.2 3 2 The agent converted the check to cash and gave
it to the officers. Later, Eagle's agent prepared a letter to STC,
falsely stating that STC would receive a volume discount for the
buses. 23 3 The discount was intended to disguise the illicit nature
of the $50,000 payment.
A trial court acquitted Eagle's president and vice president of
charges that they approved the payment to the STC president and
vice president in violation of the FCPA, citing insufficient evidence

225.
226.
227.

See id. at 698.83-.84.
See id. at 698.77.
See id. at 698.87.

228.

See 1 FCPA Rep. 101.016.

229.

See id.

230.

United States v. Morton, 2 FCPA Rep. 698.62 (N.D. Tex. 1990); United

States v. Blondek, 2 FCPA Rep. 698.68 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
231.
232.

See Blondek, 2 FCPA Rep. at 698.69.
See id.

233.

See id. at 698.6901.
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of intent to bribe the Canadian officials. 23 4 Eagle's agent pleaded
guilty to conspiracy to violate the FCPA and was sentenced to
probation for three years. 23 5
Eagle avoided prosecution by
cooperating with the DOJ, but was permanently enjoined from
236
violating the FCPA.
The DOJ, conceding that foreign officials could not be
prosecuted for violating the FCPA, nevertheless sought to
prosecute the Canadian officials for conspiring to violate the
FCPA. The federal district court dismissed the indictment against
the Canadian officials, ruling that the FCPA's exemption of
foreign officials from prosecution disallowed use of a general
conspiracy statute to charge those same officials with conspiring
23 7
to violate the FCPA.
In its ruling, the district court noted "the overwhelming
evidence of a Congressional intent to exempt foreign officials from
prosecution for receiving bribes" even though Congress possessed
the power to reach foreign officials. 23 8 The drafters of the FCPA,
the court asserted, were aware of the potential jurisdictional,

enforcement, and diplomatic difficulties posed by application of
the law to non-citizens. This awareness prompted the drafters to
intentionally exclude foreign officials from the reach of the
23 9
FCPA.
240
k. More Plane Dealings

A retired general from the Dominican Republic, his aide, a
pilot, and a lawyer were accused of participating in a scheme to
violate the FCPA by paying bribes to Dominican generals in
exchange for the release of aircraft seized in narcotics trafficking
prosecutions. The pilot and the aide both pleaded guilty to
conspiring to violate the FCPA and were sentenced to three years
probation. The lawyer was acquitted by a court ruling that the

234.
See id. at 698.6902-.6906.
235.
See United States v. Morton, 2 FCPA Rep. 698.62, 698.65-.67 (N.D.
Tex. 1990).
236.
See United States v. Eagle Bus Mfg., 2 FCPA 698.6910 (S.D. Tex.

1990).
237.
United States v. Blondek, 741 F. Supp. 116 (N.D. Tex. 1990), affd
United States v. Castle, 925 F. 2d 831 (5th Cir. 1991). Blondek established that
the DOJ cannot target foreign government officials under the FCPA. However, the
OECD Convention may expand the DOJ's ability to target foreign government
officials through cooperation with foreign authorities. See discussion infra, at
notes 375-80.
238.
239.

Blondek, 741 F. Supp. at 119.
See id.

240.

United States v. Pou, 1 FCPA Rep. 102.008 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
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evidence presented at trial was insufficient to sustain a
conviction. The general fled to the Dominican Republic prior to
241
his trial.
2 42
1. It Didn't Ad Up

The DOJ accused Young & Rubicam Incorporated (Young &
Rubicam), an advertising company, of making payments to the
Jamaican Minister of Tourism and another Jamaican tourism
official. 24 3
In exchange for the payments, the two officials
allegedly used their positions to help Young & Rubicam secure an
advertising account with the Tourist Board of Jamaica and to
induce the Tourist Board "to make unnecessary and excessive
24 4
expenditures for advertising services."
The illicit payments were passed from Young & Rubicam to
certain intermediaries who deposited the payments with a
company created for receiving the kickbacks. 2 45 One intermediary received additional payment after he threatened to expose the
bribes, and the New York regional director of the Jamaica
Tourism Board also received payments after he discovered the
246
bribes.
In addition to paying kickbacks, a subsidiary of Young &
Rubicam made shirts to be used in the Minister of Tourism's
reelection campaign. The value of the shirts was deducted from
2 47
the amount of kickbacks paid to the Tourism Minister.
Young & Rubicam prepared periodic submissions to the DOJ
pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act in which it listed
foreign agents working on behalf of the company and described
their activities. 2 48 With one exception, the company declined to
disclose the existence of the Jamaican company in its DOJ
submissions. When a Young & Rubicam account executive
referred to disbursements to the Jamaican company in a

241.
See id. at 102.008.
242.
United States v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 2 FCPA Rep. 698.38 (D. Conn.
1989). The court's ruling on several pretrial motions not directly connected with
the substance of the FCPA claim in this case is reported at United States v. Young
& Rubicam, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 334 (D. Conn. 1990).
243.
See Young & Rubicam, Inc., 2 FCPA Rep. at 698.39.
244. Id.
245.
See id. at 698.40-.45.
246.

See id. at 698.40.

247.
248.

See id. at 698.44.
See generally id.

1286

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 32:1249

submission, the kickback scheme was threatened with
2 49
exposure.
As a result of its activities, the company was charged with
violating the FCPA, RICO, and state bribery law, and with
conspiring to violate the FCPA. 25 0 Young & Rubicam pleaded
guilty to conspiring to bribe a Jamaican official and paid a
$500,000 fine. 2 5 1 The DOJ also brought charges against Young
& Rubicam's executive vice president, vice president, senior vice
president and director of business affairs, and an account
executive.2 5 2 The charges against the individual officers were
25 3
dismissed for lack of evidence.
25 4
m. Tired Out

An official of the Iraqi Trading Company, a state-owned
agency through which the Iraqi government purchased all of its
tires, told the regional export manager of Goodyear International
Corporation (Goodyear) that he would assist Goodyear in
obtaining business with the Iraqi government in exchange for a
The Iraqi official indicated that Goodyear
cash payment.
competitors in France, Korea, and Japan were willing to pay him
cash commissions. If Goodyear did not make the payments, the
Iraqi official indicated that the company would receive only
255
limited business from the Iraqi government.
The Goodyear export manager informed the Iraqi official that
paying the commissions violated company policy. Later, the
export manager repeated the conversation to his direct superior
who, in turn, discussed the matter with Goodyear's European
director and a Goodyear vice president. The vice president told
him to "get the business, I don't want to know how", and he
relayed the mandate to the export manager originally in contact
256
with the Iraqi official.
Amidst negotiations over the exact amount Goodyear would
pay the Iraqi official, he arrived at Goodyear's offices in Greece.

249.
250.

See id. at 698.44.
See generally id.

251.

See id. at 698.5101.

252.

See id. at 698.38-.39.

253,

See 1 FCPA Rep. 10 1.015.

254.

United States v. Goodyear Int'l Corp., 2 FCPA Rep. 698.1601 (D.D.C.

1989).

255,
See id. at 698.19.
256. Id. This provides yet another example of the head-in-the-sand
managerial approach the FCPA does not permit a corporation or corporate officer
to adopt.
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The Iraqi official produced an advance copy of a report that
detailed the Iraqi government's tire requirements for the following
year, the contents of which would not be available to Goodyear
competitors for several months. The Iraqi official accepted the
commission proposed by the export manager and insisted that he
25 7
be paid in cash.
To disguise the cash payments, the export manager
commissioned a Greek company to prepare marketing reports for
Goodyear, and paid the Greek company an amount well in excess
of the value of the reports. The Greek company deposited the
proceeds of the marketing reports in its bank account, then
transferred funds to the personal account of Goodyear's export
manager. The export manager subsequently withdrew the money
and made a cash payment to the Iraqi official. Later, when the
Iraqi official required another payment, the export manager
arranged for a Greek advertising company to bill Goodyear for
fictional advertising charges. Once again, money was transferred
from the advertising company's bank account to the export
manager's personal account so that he could make cash
payments to the Iraqi official. Through the sham transactions,
Goodyear paid bribes to the official totaling nearly a million
25 8
dollars.

Goodyear eventually discovered the bribery scheme during
an internal investigation and informed the DOJ that it had
uncovered potential FCPA violations. 25 9 After the subsequent
DOJ investigation, Goodyear pleaded guilty to bribery charges,
paid a $250,000 fine, and agreed to cooperate with the DOJ
investigation of other involved parties. 2 60 Goodyear's regional
export manager pleaded guilty to federal income tax violations
after he failed to report $75,000 he received in kickbacks for his
role in the bribery scheme. 2 6 1 The regional export manager was
sentenced to two years of probation and was fined $10,000.262

257.

See id. at 698.19-.20.

258.
259.

See id. at 698.20.
See id. at 698.21

260.
261.

See id. at 698.17-.18.
Pete Yost, Government Says Former Top Executives Involved in Scheme

to Pay Bribes, Assoc. PRESS, May 11, 1989, available in LEXIS, News Library, AP
File.
262.
Id.
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263
n. Plane Guilty

The DOJ charged Venturian Corporation (Venturian) and its
subsidiary Napco International (Napco) with bribing a foreign
official in violation of the FCPA, preparing false corporate tax
returns and accounting records to disguise bribes, and
conspiring to defraud the U.S. government. 26 4 Specifically, the
companies were charged with making payments to a captain in
the Niger Air Force and his cousin, Embassy Counsel at the Niger
Embassy in Washington. In exchange for the payments, the Niger
officials were to use their influence to secure contracts for aircraft
parts and maintenance contracts with the Air Force and Ministry
of Defense of Niger, for which the officials would receive payments
representing ten percent of the net revenue Napco realized on the
contracts.265

The vice president of Napco's aerospace division authorized
commission payments to individuals identified as "agents" who
were, in fact, relatives of the Niger air force captain and, in one
instance, included his cousin's girlfriend. The "agents" performed
no services for Napco, and Napco's vice president made the
payments knowing that they would be forwarded to the air force
captain and his cousin. 2 6 6 When the cousin married, Napco's
vice president paid for the newlyweds to fly to Niger for the
wedding and to Europe for the honeymoon. The airline tickets
were charged on a Napco credit card and were characterized as
"commission expenses" in company records. 2 67
Venturian and Napco ultimately pleaded guilty to charges of
conspiracy, bribery of a foreign official, and filing a false tax
return. 2 68 The companies were ordered to pay $785,000 in fines,
$140,000 to the U.S. government for settlement of civil liability,
and $75,000 for settlement of tax liability. 2 69 The vice president
of Napco's aerospace division was convicted at trial. 2 70 His
conviction was reversed later on grounds unrelated to the FCPA,

263. United States v. Napco Int'l, 2 FCPA Rep. 697.74 (D. Minn. 1989);
United States v. Liebo, 2 FCPA Rep. 697.97 (D. Minn. 1989).
264. See Napco Intl, 2 FCPA Rep. at 697.74.
265. See id. at 697.75.
266. See id.
267. See id. at 697.76.
268
See id. at 697.77.
269. See id.
270. See Former Minnesota Company Executive Convicted of Bribing Foreign
Officials, 2 FCPA Rep. 698.16.
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and he was retried. 2 7 1 The vice president was re-convicted and
sentenced to eighteen months in prison.2 72 His initial sentence
was suspended, and he received three years of probation, sixty
days of home confinement, and 600 hours of community
2 73
service.
2. SEC Accounting Enforcement 27 4
As noted above, the accounting provisions of the FCPA were
enacted to prohibit the use of off-the-books slush funds for
making payments to foreign officials.2 75 The SEC enforces the
accounting provisions through administrative proceedings and
civil actions brought in federal district court under the SEA, as
Violations of the FCPA accounting
amended by the FCPA.
provisions often are intertwined with other unlawful behavior
policed by the SEC, such as the preparation of materially
misleading quarterly or annual financial reports, false statements
to auditors, and insider trading. 2 76 Thus, in addition to fines for
FCPA accounting violations, other penalties may be imposed on
accounting provision violators under other laws. For example,
accounting violations may lead to being barred from serving as
the officer or director of a publicly traded company, barred from

practicing as an accountant before the SEC, or ordered to
27 7
disgorge monies received from insider trading.
2
a. IBM

78

The DOJ recently commenced investigation of IBM due to
alleged payments made by IBM's Argentine subsidiary to

See United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308 (8th Cir. 1991).
271.
272.
See Former Minnesota Company Executive Convicted of Bribing Foreign
Officials, supra note 270, at 698.16.
See 1 FCPA Rep. 101.013.
273.
There are many more reported cases involving violations of the
274.
accounting provisions than there are of the bribery provisions. Therefore, the
following summary briefly covers only some of the most recent SEC civil actions
based on the FCPA accounting provisions.
275.
See supra notes 62-68 and accompanying text.
276.
The accounting enforcement actions discussed infra provide several
examples of this. See infra Parts II.B.2.a-h.
277.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78(u)(d)(2) [19941; 17 C.F.R. § 201.102(e) [1999]; see
also, e.g., SEC v. Bilzerian, 814 F. Supp. 116 (D.D.C. 1993) (disgorgement
appropriate remedy for security law violation).
Homer E. Moyer, Jr., The FCPA: The Evolving Picture of Risks,
278.
Compliance, and Enforcement, at 9 (speech given Nov. 17, 1998; copy of handout
on file with authors).
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Argentine tax authorities conducted

a

routine audit of a local company and discovered that millionb of
dollars reported as paid to the company were, in fact, either
deposited in a Swiss bank account or were missing. 2 80 The U.S.
criminal investigation proceeded on the theory that IBM used the
28 1
local shell company to pay bribes to government officials.
Although no direct evidence in support of the DOJ theory has
been exposed, IBM has lost the contract in issue and has become
embroiled in several related civil lawsuits. 28 2 Allegations that
IBM ignored competitive bidding requirements and overcharged
the Argentine government have also prompted local investigation
28 3
of other major IBM contracts.
2
b. Triton Energy

84

Triton Indonesia, a Delaware corporation, entered into a joint
venture for the operation of a gas and oil recovery project in
Indonesia.2 8 5
Triton Indonesia's work was supervised by
Pertamina, Indonesia's national oil company. 2 86 Under the joint
venture, Triton Indonesia was entitled to reimbursement of
287
certain expenditures related to oil and gas exploration.
Auditors from Pertamina and the Indonesian Ministry of Finance
performed joint audits of Triton Indonesia to verify the amount of
reimbursements and to assess tax liability. 2 88 In these audit
"negotiations," Triton Indonesia allegedly made an improper
payment to a government official to favorably influence the
results of the audit. 2 89 Later, Triton Indonesia allegedly hired an
2 90
intermediary to make subsequent improper payments.
The SEC claimed that Triton Indonesia made payments to its
business agent "knowing or recklessly disregarding the high
probability" that the agent would pass the payments to
Indonesian government officials to influence their decisions

279.
280.
281.
282.
283.
284.
285.
286.
287.
288.
289.
290.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 9-10.
See id. at 10.
SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.471 (D.D.C. 1997).
See In re David Gore, 3 FCPA Rep. at 699.463.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 699.464.
See id.
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during the audit to the business advantage of Triton
291
Indonesia.
The SEC charged officers of Triton Indonesia with violating
the accounting provisions of the FCPA by making false entries to
conceal the nature of the payments, and further asserted that
Triton Indonesia failed to create and maintain adequate internal
accounting controls that would have revealed the improper
payments. 2 92 The SEC also accused officers of Triton Energy of
knowing about the nature of the payments Triton Indonesia made
or
to its business agent and of failing to establish policies
2 93
procedures that would have prevented the FCPA violation.
Ultimately, the SEC filed a civil injunction action against
Triton Energy Corporation and the president and vice president of
its subsidiary Triton Indonesia, alleging violations of the FCPA's
accounting provisions. 2 94 The SEC also instituted administrative
proceedings against the president and vice president of Triton
Energy, the commercial manager of Triton Indonesia and the
The SEC reached a penalty
controller of Triton Indonesia.
agreement with Triton Energy under which Triton Energy paid a
$300,000 penalty and the president of Triton Indonesia paid a
$50,000 penalty. The president and vice president of Triton
Energy, the commercial manager of Triton Indonesia, and the
controller of Triton Indonesia agreed to "cease and desist" from
committing further violations of the SEA or the FCPA. 2 95 In
June, 1997, the SEC filed a consent settlement with the vice
president of Triton Indonesia, who agreed to pay a $35,000
fine. 2 96 While most actions under the FCPA accounting provision
do not involve allegations of bribery, the Triton case directly
involved such allegations. Because the SEC pursued the action,
rather than the DOJ, the penalties imposed were civil rather than
criminal.
2 97
c. Eating Crow

The SEC alleged that the former president and chairman of
the board of Wilshire Technologies, Incorporated (Wilshire)
caused the company to overstate its earnings from the sale of new

291.
1997).
292.

See SEC v. Triton Energy Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.471, 699.471 (D.D.C.
See id.

293.
294.

See id. at 699.472.
See id. at 699.471.

295.
296.

See id. at 699.472.
See id. at 699.473.

297.

SEC v. Crow, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.559 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
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and untested products in two quarterly financial statements. The
SEC alleged that his behavior violated the record-keeping
and
2 98
internal control provisions of the FCPA and the SEA.

The president of Wilshire eventually consented to a final
judgment enjoining him from violating the accounting and recordkeeping provisions of the SEA. The president was also enjoined
from violating the insider trading, antifraud, and internal control
provisions of the securities laws. The president was ordered to
pay disgorgement of $1,248,444, plus interest, and was barred
from serving as an officer or director of a company that reports to
the SEC.

299

d. Laser Photonics 3 ° °
The SEC accused the former president and CEO of Laser
Photonics, Inc. of violating the record-keeping and accounting
control provisions of the SEA by falsifying company records in
order to inflate the company's publicly reported revenues and
profits. The president and other company officers allegedly
ordered the creation of documents that reflected fictitious sales
and that improperly recorded sales returns and billing errors.
The president also was accused of trying to cover up the scheme
by forging, altering, and concealing corporate records, and by
procuring false sales confirmations from company customers in
30 1
order to deceive company auditors.
The president consented to the entry of a final judgment
enjoining him from future violations of the record-keeping
provisions of the SEA, barring him from serving as a company
officer or director for five years, and ordering him to pay a civil
penalty of $40,000.302
30 3
e. Micro Management

The former president of California Micro Devices Corporation
was accused of participating in falsification of company shipment
records in order to inflate the company's publicly reported
revenue. The former managers of the company's manufacturing

298.

See id. at 699.560.

299.

See id. at 699.559-.560.

300.
301.
302.
303.

SEC v. Fukuhara, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.560 (M.D. Fla. 1998).
See id.
See id.
SEC v. Gupta, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.549 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
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plants also were accused of falsifying sales and shipment
30 4
records.
The president and plant managers reached settlement
agreements with the SEC. The president was assessed a civil
penalty of $72,250, was barred from serving as an officer or
director of a public company, and was enjoined from future
The plant managers were
violations of the securities laws.
profits and to pay civil
trading
ordered to disgorge all insider
They were also
violations.
other
and
penalties for insider trading
company
a
public
of
officers or directors
barred from serving 3as
05
period.
five-year
for a
The company's former chief accounting officer was
prosecuted in a separate action for record-keeping violations and
insider trading.3 0 6 A final judgment ordered the accounting
officer to disgorge an insider trading penalty of $86,000, barred
him from serving as an officer or director of a public company,
and imposed a separate civil penalty of $86,000. In a separate
administrative proceeding against the officer, the SEC obtained a
him from practicing as an accountant
consent order prohibiting
30 7
before the SEC.
f. Sensormatic

30 8

The SEC filed a civil action in federal court against three
officers of Sensormatic Electronics Corporation (Sensormatic),
instituted an administrative proceeding against the company, and
brought administrative proceedings against the company's former
controller and the former director of management information
30 9
systems.
The civil action filed by the SEC alleged that Sensormatic's
executive vice president and its vice president of finance
supervised manipulation of the company's quarterly revenue and
earnings statements in order to inflate revenue recognition in a
particular quarter to reach earnings goals and meet analyst
quarterly earnings provisions.3 1 0 The revenue and earnings
manipulation allegedly was achieved by falsifying shipment and

See id.
304.
See id.
305.
See SEC v. Romito, No. 95-29857 (N.D. Cal., Dec. 19, 1995), available
306.
at <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/r14776.txt>.
See id.
307.
In re Sensormatic Electronics Corp., 3 FCPA Rep. 699.546 (D.D.C.
308.

1998).
309.
310.

See id. at 699.546.
Seeid.
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sales records. To conceal the record-keeping irregularities, the
officers ordered the creation of false accounting records, made
false statements to company auditors, and intentionally
circumvented internal corporate accounting controls. The former
president was accused of declining to halt the improper
accounting practices even though he was aware of their
existence. The final judgment in the civil action fined two officers
$50,000 each and fined another officer $40,000. One of the
officers settled in a separate administrative proceeding, which
barred him from practicing before the SEC as an accountant for a
311
period of five years.
In the administrative proceeding, the SEC made the same
allegations of revenue and earnings manipulation against
Sensormatic that it made against the individual officers in the
civil matter.3 12 The SEC charged that the alleged practices
violated the FCPA record-keeping and internal control provisions.
Sensormatic consented to a cease and desist order but did not
3 13
suffer any pecuniary liability.
The SEC also brought administrative proceedings against
Sensormatic's controller and director of information systems.

According to the SEC order, the controller was aware that
shipping documents were backdated, which created inaccurately
recorded revenue so that Sensormatic's earnings were misstated.
The controller was barred from practicing before the SEC as an
accountant for a period of three years. The company's director of
information systems also was accused of falsifying accounting
records and was enjoined from further violation of the record3 14
keeping and internal control provisions of the SEA.
3
g. Bausch & Lomb

15

A former sales director of the contact lens division of Bausch
& Lomb was accused of violating the FCPA record-keeping and
internal control provisions. The sales director "knew, or was
reckless in not knowing" that the company recorded revenue from
consignment sales in a manner that overstated annual company
income.3 1 6 The sales director consented to the entry of a final
judgment ordering him to pay a $10,000 civil penalty and

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.

See id. at 699.547-.548.
See id. at 699.546.
See id. at 699.547.
See id, at 699.548.
SEC v. Logan, 3 FCPA Rep. 699.509 (D.D.C. 1997).
See id.
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enjoining him from further violation of the record-keeping and
3 17
internal controls provisions of the FCPA.
3 18

h. DeGeorge

The SEC filed a civil action in federal court alleging that the
chief executive officer and controlling stockholder of DeGeorge
Financial Corporation repeatedly failed to disclose to company
auditors related-party transactions and the use of company funds
to pay personal expenses. The officer was ordered to disgorge
$204,000 and to pay civil penalties of $50,000 for his violation of
control provisions, and
the FCPA record-keeping and accounting
3 19
other violations of the securities laws.

In a separate administrative proceeding, the company was
ordered to cease and desist violation of the record-keeping and
internal control provisions and to retain an independent

consultant to review company policies and procedures governing
related-party transactions. The company was not ordered to pay
3 20
any fines.

III.

ANTI-CORRUPTION MULTILATERALISM AND ITS DOMESTIC EFFECTS

Powerful financial organizations have globalized corruption as an
accepted tool of business; the fight against corruption must be
globalized as well.
321
- OscarAriasSanchez
[F]ighting corruption requires many leaders. In national and local
governments, in parliaments and city councils, in the judiciary and
security forces and among citizens in every community. It also
requires partnership. No single effort will do the job.
-

3 22

Donald J. Johnston

317.
See id.
SEC v. DeGeorge, C.A. No. 3:97 CV 2382 (D. Conn., Nov. 12, 1997),
318.
available at <http://www.sec.gov/enforce/litigrel/lr15556.txt>.
See id.
319.
See id.
320.
321.
Oscar Arias Sanchez, Foreword to NATIONAL INTEGRITY SYSTEMS: THE TI
SOURCE BOOK (visited Oct. 27, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/
source-book/foreword.html>. Sanchez was the president of Costa Rica from 1986
to 1990 and won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1987 for his peace efforts in Central
America.
322.
Donald J. Johnston, Building Integrity in Government: The OECD as
Part of a Multiple Response-Address at the Global Forum on Fighting Corruption
and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (Feb. 24, 1999)
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A. The OECD Convention on Bribery
The OECD Convention was completed in November 1997 and
was signed the following month. In addition to the twenty-nine
member countries of the OECD, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria,
Chile, and the Czech Republic signed the Convention and
committed themselves to enacting legislation to criminalize the
3 23
bribery of foreign officials.
1. Background
The importance of the OECD Convention is instilled by its
potent membership, which encompasses all of the world's major
economic powers and binds all companies doing business out of
those countries. The Convention, however, is not the first step
taken in international collaboration against business corruption.
Multilateral organizations,
both governmental
and nongovernmental, laid the groundwork for the Convention with a
series of earlier initiatives. The convergence of these initiatives,
noted infra, in the mid-1990s facilitated the broad consensus

among the OECD's disparate membership for adoption of the
ambitions agenda of the Convention.
a. Inter-Governmental Efforts
The Organization of American States (OAS) presaged the
OECD agreement when its members adopted the first multilateral
anti-bribery initiative in March 1996.324 The Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption (OAS Convention) entered into
force the next year in March 1997 and required its signatories to
enact statutes that, like the FCPA, criminalize the bribery of
government officials. 326
The OAS Convention provides for
327
extradition of violators 3 26 and seizure of their assets,

<http://v.ww.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/document/ohns.htm>. The
Honorable Donald J. Johnston is the Secretary-General of the OECD.
323.
See OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3.
324. The countries that have signed the OAS Convention are Argentina, the
Bahamas, Bolivia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad & Tobago, the
United States, Uruguay, and Venezuela. See Inter-American Convention Against
Corruption
(visited
Oct.
28,
1999)
<http://www.oas.org/En/prog/

juridico/english/Sigs/b-58.html>.
325.
See Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, March 29, 1996, S.
TREATY Doc. No. 105-39, art. Ill (1998).
326.

See id. art. XIII.
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establishes accounting and disclosure provisions,3 28 and calls for
The OAS
international cooperation in evidence-gathering.3 29
Convention has functioned as a geographic and legal bridge from
the FCPA to the OECD Convention.
In February 1996, the United States Trade Representative
(USTR) formally requested the World Trade Organization (WTO) to
assume a leadership role in combating bribery and corruption by
passing anti-bribery measures at the first WTO ministerial
meetings in December 1996.330 The USTR argued, in part, that
the composition of the WTO allowed it, better than other, more
industrialized multilateral organizations, to pass measures
banning the receipt of a bribe.3 3 ' Although the WTO did not
address the issue with the specificity the USTR desired, it issued
a Ministerial Declaration that created a working group to
research
transparency
in
the government procurement
process. 3 32 In June 1999, the OECD announced that it would
333
analyze how WTO rules combat corruption and bribery.

In November 1996, the Economic and Social Council of the
United Nations submitted to the General Assembly a draft
Declaration Against Corruption and Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions. The Declaration stated the Council's
resolve that members of the United Nations should enact
domestic legislation to prohibit bribery of foreign officials and tax
deductions for such corrupt payments. 3 34 The General Assembly
adopted the Declaration in December 1996. 335
On May 26, 1997, the European Union Council adopted a
"Convention in the fight against corruption involving officials of
the European Communities or officials of the Member States of
the European Union." 33 6 This Convention criminalizes bribery of

327.
328.

See id. art. XIV.
See id. art. III.

329.
See id. art. XIV.
330.
See WTO, Statement by the Honourable Charlene Barshefsky Acting
United States Trade Representative (Dec. 9, 1996) (visited Oct. 10, 1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/archives/st5.htm>.
331.
See id.
332.
See WTO, Singapore MinisterialDeclaration(Dec. 18, 1996) (visited Oct.
10,
1999)
<http://www.wto.org/wto/archives/wtodec.htm>.
Transparency
International, discussed infra Part III.A. 1.6, recently applied more pressure to the
WTO to assert its authority against corruption in international trade. See WTO
Urged to Act on Trade Corruption,FIN. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1998, at 10.
333.
OECD to Study How WTO Rules Combat Corruption and Bribery, INSIDE

U.S. TRADE, June 18, 1999.

334.

See U.N. GAOR, 51st Sess., Agenda Item 12, U.N. Doc. A/RES/51/191

(1997) accessed at <gopher://gopher.un.org:70/00/ga/recs/51/RES51-EN. 191>.
335.
See id.
336.
1997 O.J. 1 (C195).
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officials whether or not Community financial interests are at
stake, but it is limited to acts of7 bribery involving European
33
Union and Member State officials.
In June 1997, leaders of the G-7-the United States, France,
Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Canada-plus
representatives of Russia and the European Union met at the
Denver Economic Summit and established an agenda to fight
corruption.3 3 8 The G-7 agreed to coordinate their anti-corruption
activities and to encourage other countries to follow suit.3 3 9 The
G-7 finance ministers reconvened in April 1998 in Washington,

337.
See id. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe
established the Group of States Against Corruption (GRECO) in May 1998.
GRECO's stated purpose is to fight corruption through "mutual evaluation and
peer pressure." Agreement Establishing The Group of States Against CorruptionGRECO, Comm. Of Ministers, 102nd Sess., Res. (98) 7 (May 6, 1998), available at
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/ fraud/fcpa/E2198.htm>. As a continuation of
the establishment of GRECO, the Council of Europe passed its own anticorruption treaty on January 27, 1999.
See Criminal Law Convention on
Corruption, Jan.
27,
1999,
Europ.
T.S.
No.
173,
available at
<http://www.coe.fr/eng/legaltxt/173e.htm>.
The Council's treaty is patterned
after the OECD Convention, but certain provisions stand out as unique. First, the
Council of Europe's treaty criminalizes acts constituting "trading in influence."
The treaty defines "trading in influence" as making improper payment to someone
who claims to have an improper influence over a governmental decisionmaker. Id.
art. 12.
"Trading in influence" is considered "background corruption" that
undermines the trust citizens place in public administration. Explanatory Report
on the Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, Council of Europe, GMC (98) 40
(Dec. 1, 1998), available at <http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/fraud/fcpa/
gmc9840e.htm> (explaining Article 12). Second, the treaty explicitly states that
"collaborators of justice and witnesses" will receive special protection.
See
Criminal Law Convention on Corruption, supra art. 21. Concern for the safety of
"collaborators of justice" may require anonymity, bodyguards, or changes of
identity. See Explanatory Report, supra art. 21. Third, the treaty encourages
parties to provide each other with "spontaneous information." See Criminal Law
Convention on Corruption, supra art. 22. Given the transnational character of
corruption, one state may obtain information regarding acts of corruption in other
states, and governments should be encouraged to share such information with
any party that has jurisdiction over the offense. See Explanatory Report, supra
art. 22.
The Current Signatories to the treaty are Albania, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Cyprus, Denmark, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Portugal,
Romania, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden, the former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom.
European Council, Chart of
Signatures and Ratifications (visited Oct. 5,
1999) <http://vrvw.coe.fr/
tablconv/ 173t.htm>. The substantial participation of eastern European countries
is notable, given their general absence from other anti-corruption measures.
338.
Office of the Chief Counsel for International Commerce, US
Department of Commerce, The Anti-Corruption Review (Jan. 1999) (visited Oct. 5,
1999) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/main.htm>.
339.
See id.
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D.C. and issued a communiqu6 in support of the anti-corruption
efforts of other parties, including international financial
3 40
institutions and the OECD.
3 41
b. Non-Governmental Efforts

Transparency International formed in 1994 with the sole
purpose of curbing corruption "by mobilising a global coalition to
promote and strengthen international and national Integrity
Systems."3 42 With chapters either formed or forming in over
ninety countries, Transparency International has already
catalyzed much reform, including the OECD Convention,3 43 and
continues to participate in important debates on corruption and
3 44
to lobby for enhanced anti-bribery initiatives.
While Transparency International shares goals with those
who enact anti-bribery legislation-eliminating corruption and its
antidemocratic effects-it employs a different approach to achieve
those goals.3 45 Instead of attempting to expose individual cases,

340.
See id.
341.
Although non-governmental efforts are not coupled with enforcement
capability, they possess a certain moral authority that can influence the
decisionmaking of those in government who can enact and enforce desirable
policy.
342. Transparency International, Mission Statement (visited Oct. 5, 1999)
<http://wwwv.transparency.de/mission.html>.
343.
See, e.g., David Sanger, Business Bribes To ForeignersTo Be Banned By
End of 1998, N.Y. TIMES, May 24, 1997, at 5 (noting Transparency International's
involvement in passage of OECD Convention); Paul Blustein, Pact to Bar Bribery Is
Reached; MajorNations Agree To U.S. Request, WASH. POST, May 24, 1997, at F-1.
344.
For example, Transparency International was well-represented at the
recent Global Forum on Fighting Corruption. See Chad Bowman, Gore to Unveil
Diplomatic Initiatives in Fight Against International Corruption, DAILY REP. FOR
EXECUTIVES, FEB. 23, 1999, at A-27 (quoting Transparency International
representative). Indeed, Transparency International's Managing Director Jeremy
Pope spoke at the opening session with U.S. Vice President Al Gore, U.S.
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, OECD Secretary General Donald Johnson,
and U.N. Crime Center Executive Director Pino Arlacchi. U.S. Department of
State Office of the Spokesman, Media Schedule for Vice President Gore's Global
Forum on Fighting Corruption, February 24-26, 1999 (visited Oct. 5, 1999)

<http://secretary.

state.gov/www/briefings/statements/ 1999/ps990223.html>.

Transparency Inter-national is also working closely with the OECD to extend the
anti-corruption work of the two groups into eastern and central Europe. See
Lawrence Speer, OECD, 'Transparency' Group Open Front in East Europe in War
Against Corruption,DAILY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Jan. 13, 1999, at A-5.
345. Transparency International's approach is premised on the belief that
simply enacting anti-corruption laws fails to achieve long-term change, observing
that "if it were just a matter of laws and enforcement, the problem of corruption
would have been solved long ago.
Even countries with the worst levels of
corruption have laws banning public service corruption. These laws are simply
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as the DOJ does, Transparency International emphasizes
prevention and systemic reform. 3 46 In an attempt to apply
pressure to various governments and stimulate public debate
about corruption, Transparency International began publishing a
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) in 1995 and the Bribe Payers
Perception Index (BPI) in 1999.3 4 7 The CPI is derived from
numerous polls of experts and the general public regarding their
perceptions of the extent of corruption.3 48 Ninety-nine countries
are ranked in numerical order, creating a "who's who" in
corruption image from Denmark, currently perceived as the least
corrupt nation, to Cameroon, currently viewed as the most
3 49
corrupt.
Perhaps more relevant to the OECD Convention than the
CPI, the BPI ranks the largest exporting countries in terms of
their perceived willingness (based on polling in fourteen
developing countries) to pay bribes to win business. 3 5 0 The BPI
revealed that countries such as China/Hong Kong and South
Korea were most willing to pay bribes, while Sweden, Australia,
and Canada were viewed as least willing. 3 s 1 Upon the release of
the BPI, the chairman of Transparency International urged that
governments of leading exporting countries "must take
headquartered in their
determined actions to stop businesses
3 52
countries from bribing foreign officials."

Transparency
never enforced and systems of accountability are ignored."
International, Applying the Framework- Administrative Reforms, in NATIONAL
1999)
INTEGRITY SYSTEMS: THE TI SOURCE BOOK (visited Oct. 5,
<http://www.transparency.de/documents/source-book/b/Chapter.7/index.
html.>.
346. This is, perhaps, a luxury possessed by international organizations
such as Transparency International that a government cannot afford. While an
international organization may engage in philosophical debate and organize extragovernmental efforts, an administration must obtain convictions to demonstrate
its determination to solve a problem.
347.

Nov.

5,

Transparency International, The Corruption Perceptions Index (visited

1999)

release.html>.

<http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/cpi-bpi-press-

On October 26, 1999, Transparency International released its

latest Corruption Perceptions Index and a new Bribe Payers Perception Index.
The Bribe Payers Perception Index ranks the leading exporting nations by the
extent to which their domestic firms are perceived to engage in bribery abroad.
See id.
348. See id.
349. See id.
350. Transparency International, 1999 Bribe Payers Index (visited Nov. 15,
1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html>.
351. Id.
352. Transparency International, New Poll Shows Many Leading Exporters
Using Bribes (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http://wvwv.transparency.de/documents/
cpi-bpLpress-release.html>.
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The BPI indicates that the willingness to pay bribes is
partially a function of culture. While U.S. companies have long
been subject to the formal anti-bribery constraints of the FCPA,
U.S. companies did not distinguish themselves for their antibribery rectitude in the BPI survey.
Another non-public group furthered the cause of anti-bribery
advocates in March 1996 by urging its membership to adopt new
conduct rules to eliminate bribery and extortion in international
The conduct rules of the International Chamber of
trade.
Commerce (ICC) advocated stronger domestic laws, enhanced
enforcement of those laws, increased governmental transparency,
353
and the elimination of tax deductions for corrupt payments.
More specifically, the ICC rules stated that private businesses
may not give or receive bribes or kickbacks, may not make
unreasonably high payments to agents, must properly account
for all transactions, should propagate anti-corruption codes, and
should create internal control systems as a prophylactic
measure.3 S 4 The ICC issued new Rules of Conduct in 1999 that
3s s
prohibit extortion and bribery for any purpose.
In August 1996, the World Bank released guidelines
regarding procurement financed by loans from the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development or credits from the
Pursuant to the
International Development Association. 3 5 6
are all
and
contractors
suppliers,
guidelines, borrowers, bidders,
during
of
ethics"
standard
"highest
the
required to observe
procurement and execution of contracts.3 S 7 If a bidder is believed
to have engaged in corruption or fraud, the World Bank will reject
proposals for awards.3 5 8 Likewise, if a borrower is found to have
engaged in similar conduct, the remaining portions of loans
already granted will be canceled.3 5 9 In either event, the company
will be barred from World Bank financing for an indefinite period
of time, and the World Bank will claim a right to inspect and

See International Chamber of Commerce, Extortion and Bribery in
353.
International Business Transactions Rules and Recommendations (visited Oct. 11,
1999) <http://www.iccwbo.org/home/statements_.rules/rules/1996/briberydoc.
asp>.
See id.
354.
355.
See International Chamber of Commerce, Preface to 1999 Edition of ICC
Rules of Conduct, (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.iccwbo.org/Commissions/
Extortion-bribery/briberydoc99.htm>.
WORLD BANK, GUIDELINES: PROCUREMENT UNDER IBRD LOANS AND IDA
356.
CREDITS 7 (1996) & ADDENDUM (1997); INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK,
ADDENDUM TO BASIC PROCUREMENT POLICIES AND PROCEDURES OF THE IDB (1998).

357.
358.
359.

Id.
See id.
See id.
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audit the books and records of the corrupt supplier or
3 60
contractor.
The World Bank has served noticed that it is serious about
its anti-corruption initiatives. 3 6 1
In August 1997, the
International Monetary Fund decided to halt aid to Kenya due to
systemic corruption.3 6 2 In support of the International Monetary
Fund's decision, the World Bank announced that it would not
provide a $71 million credit to Kenya until corruption concerns
were addressed.3 63 In October 1997, the World Bank sued a
former employee and an outside contractor for breach of contract,
fraud, and conspiracy, and it received favorable judgments
against all defendants in February 1999.36 4 The World Bank also
recently declared misprocurement 65 on roughly forty contracts
3
having a total value of $40 million.

360.

See id.

361.

See, e.g., Governance and Anti-Corruption (visited Nov. 4, 1999)

<http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/gac> (directory for extensive World Bank
coverage of anti-corruption efforts).
362. See Michela Wrong & Michael Holman, World Bank Warns Kenya About
Corruption, FIN. TIMES (London), Aug. 9, 1997, at 36; see also Salamat Ali,
International Politics of Kickbacks, Nov. 1, 1999 (visited Nov. 1, 1999)
<http://davn.com/daily/text/ebrl3.htm> (discussing pressure of International
Monetary Fund on Pakistan to more effectively restrict tax evasion and bribery).
363.

See id.; see also Statement of Treasury Secretary Robert E. Rubin (Feb.

24, 1999) (visited Oct. 10, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/
document/rubin.htm> (stressing the importance of international institutions to

global anti-corruption regime).
364.
See The World Bank Group, Preventing Corruptionin Bank Projects and
Keeping our Own House in Order, (visited Oct. 5,
1999) <http://
wwv.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/preventing.htm>.
365.
See id. The World Bank is quick to note that these forty contracts are
a drop in the barrel of 45,000 contracts worth about US $45-50 million. See id.
In May 1998, the World Bank established an Oversight Committee on Fraud and
Corruption to review each allegation of corruption received by members of the
World Bank Group. See id. The committee holds weekly meetings and has
established a telephone hotline with multilingual capabilities that can receive
allegations of corruption at any moment. See id. All hotline reports are forwarded
to the committee and callers may remain anonymous. See id.
The World Bank recently-and permanently--debarred an employee and three
British-registered corporations from being awarded Bank-fmanced contracts. The
allegations of fraudulent activity pertained to prccurements of computer equipment by
agencies of Turkmenistan in 1995. See Transparency International, Press Release:
World Bank Debars Staff Member & Corporations:Three UK Firns and an Individual
Accused of Corruption, (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/
documents/pressreleases/1999.21.04.wbank.htm>. It is also notable that in
January 1998, prior to the entry into force of the OECD Convention, the
International Development Bank (IDB) amended its procurement policies and
procedures to provide for inspection of financial records and penalization for
accounting improprieties. Where it discovers corrupt practices, the IDB can either
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In light of the mounting pressure from the accretion of antibribery regulations, agreements, and declarations, consensus at
the OECD began to coalesce around a global anti-bribery regime.
The awakening of anti-corruption reform demands would not
permit Western OECD members to remain aloof from corruption
problems in lesser-developed countries.3 6 6 With a membership
binding all major economic players, the OECD's anti-corruption
regime breaks new ground because of the breadth of its coverage,
not for its novelty.
2. Provisions

a. Illicit Payments
The OECD Convention entered into force on February 15,
1999, sixty days after it was ratified by Canada.3 67 The scope of
the OECD Convention is similar to that of the FCPA, requiring
signatories to
take such measures as may be necessary to establish that it is a
criminal offence under law for any person intentionally to offer,
promise or give any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether
directly or through intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for
that official or for a third party, in order that the official act or
refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official duties,
in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in
3 68
the conduct of international business.

In effect, the OECD took the FCPA definition of bribery and
broadened it. The Convention prohibits payments to foreign

reject contract awards outright or accelerate loan repayments. See IDB PRESS
RELEASE NO. NR-12198 (Jan. 29, 1998).
366.
See, e.g., Simpson, supra note 8, at A3 (according to U.S. reports,
France and Germany pay most bribes); Nora M. Rubin, A Convergence of 1996 and
1997 Global Efforts to Curb Corruption and Bribery in International Business
Transactions: The Legal Implications of the OECD Recommendations and Convention
for the United States, Germany, and Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L. L. REv. 257, 29398, 304-07 (1998) (describing German corruption and Swiss wartime financial
dealings with Nazis).
367. The Convention was to enter into force sixty days after it was ratified
by five of the ten signatory countries with the ten largest export shares. If
ratification had not occurred by December 31, 1998, the Convention would have
entered into force as soon as two signatories informed the OECD SecretaryGeneral of their intent to accept the Convention. The alternative entry-into-force
measure was avoided when Canada ratified the Convention on December 1, 1998.
368.
OECD Convention on Bribery, supra note 3, art. 1(1).
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officials to obtain or retain business or to secure any improper
3 69
advantage.
Like the FCPA, the OECD Convention applies to monetary
and non-monetary payments and to payments made through
intermediaries. 3 70 It also exempts "facilitation payments" made
to induce public officials to perform their routine governmental
functions, such as issuing licenses or permits, 3 7 1 and any
payment made for an advantage "permitted or required by the
written law or regulation of the foreign public official's country,
including case law."3 72 There is no indication, however, that
either the FCPA or the OECD Convention exempts future
payments to government officials or intermediaries arising out of
previously signed contracts through a grandfather policy or

otherwise.
An unlawful payment made to retain business is unlawful
whether or not a company already is the best-qualified bidder or
properly could be awarded the business without maling the
payment.3 73 "Other improper advantage" refers to anything to
that a company is not clearly entitled, such as an operating
permit for a factory which does not meet statutory
requirements. 3 74 Like the FCPA, the Convention does not provide
a de minimis exception that would permit payments for
advantages of value below a certain threshold.3 7 5 A payment that
violates Article 1 of the Convention is also punishable irrespective
of the results of the payment, the "perceptions of local custom,
the tolerance of such payments by local authorities, or the alleged
necessity of the payment[.] ..."376

369.

See id. art. 1.

370,

See id. art. 1(1).

371. Commentaries on the Convention Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S. TREATY DOc.
No. 105-43, at 22 (1998) [hereinafter Commentaries on the Convention].
372. Id. para. 8.
373.
See id. para 4.
374.
See id. para. 5.
375. See generally OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3.
376. Commentaries on the Convention, supranote 371, para. 7.
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b. Inchoate Offenses
Convention signatories also must
take any measures necessary to establish that complicity in,
including incitement, aiding and abetting, or authorisation of an
act of bribery of a foreign official shall be a criminal offence.
Attempt and conspiracy to bribe a foreign public official shall be
criminal offences to the same extent as attempt and conspiracy to
377
bribe a public official of that Party.

Thus, the mere proffer of an unlawful payment to a foreign official
must be punishable under each signatory's implementing
legislation to the same extent a bribe of a domestic official would
be.3 7 8 Conspiracy to bribe a foreign official will be similarly
punishable.3 7 9 As a result, a person who agrees to make an
unlawful payment will be subject to penalty if any action is taken
380
to further the goal of the agreement.
c. Foreign Officials
A "foreign public official" to whom payments may not be
made for any improper advantage can be
any person holding a legislative, administrative or judicial office of a
foreign country, whether appointed or elected; any person
exercising a public function for a foreign country; including for a
public agency or public enterprise, and any official or agent of a
3 81
public international organisation[.]

The Convention broadened the scope of "foreign public
official" to encompass officials and agents of international
organizations, officials of "all levels and subdivisions of
government, from national to local[,] "3 8 2 and possibly private
corporations if they enjoy preferential government treatment visd-vis competitors.3 8 3 Unlike the FCPA, however, the Convention
does not bar payments to foreign political parties or candidates
384
for foreign public office.

377. OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3, art. 1(2).
378. See Commentaries on the Convention, supranote 371, para. 11.
379. See OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3, art. 1(2).
380. This conclusion assumes that "conspiracy" as used in art. 1(2) of the
OECD Convention is substantially similar to "conspiracy" under U.S. law.
381. OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3, art. 1(4)(a).
382. Id. art. l(4)(b).
383. See Commentaries on the Convention, supra note 371, para. 15.
384.
See generally OECD Commentaries on Bribery, supra note 3. The
OECD's commentary accompanying the Convention indicated that such political
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d. Jurisdiction
The Convention's provision for the exercise of jurisdiction
over bribe payors is also broader than the corresponding
provisions in the FCPA. While FCPA jurisdiction is limited to
"issuers" and "domestic concerns," the Convention covers "any
person" within the territory of a state. 38 5 Significantly, the OECD
Convention obliges signatories to exercise jurisdiction over those
38 6
who bribe officials on either a territorial or nationality basis.

Territorial jurisdiction is to be exercised broadly so that "an
extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not
38 7
required."
Each signatory must review its legal framework for asserting
jurisdiction to determine if it is "effective in the fight against the
bribery of foreign public officials[.]" 3 8 8 If a signatory determines
that its jurisdictional bases are insufficient to combat bribery, it
must "take remedial steps" which, assumedly, would entail
amendment of its jurisdictional law.3 8 9
Politics enters the jurisdiction analysis when a national of
one party to the Convention makes an unlawful payment in the
territory of another party to the Convention. In such a case,
when both parties have jurisdiction over an offender, they must
consult with each other to determine "the most appropriate
390
jurisdiction for prosecution."
e. Sanctions
The Convention calls for "effective, proportionate and
dissuasive criminal penalties" as sanctions for bribery of a foreign
public official. 3 9 1 To ensure that violators receive "effective,
proportionate and dissuasive" sanctions, the signatories must
impose penalties that are "comparable to that applicable to the
bribery of the Party's own public officials."3 92 Such penalties
must include "deprivation of liberty sufficient to enable effective

payments comprised a subject of common concern that was to be addressed in
accelerated negotiations to be completed by early 1999.
385.
Id. art. i(1).

386.

See id. art. 4(l)-(2).

387.
388.
389.
390.
391.
392.

Commentaries on the Convention, supra note 371, para. 25.
OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3, art. 4(4).
Id.
Id. art. 4(3).
Id. art. 3(1).

Id.
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mutual

legal

assistance

and

extradition." 3 9 3

Civil

or

administrative sanctions may include fines, exclusive from
public
entitlement to public benefits or aid, disqualification 3from
94
procurement or placement under judicial supervision.
The OECD Convention requires countries that do not impose
criminal liability on corporations, such as Japan, to ensure that
corporations also are subject to "effective, proportionate, and
including monetary sanctions.3 9 5
sanctions,
dissuasive"
Signatories also must provide for the seizure and confiscation of
bribe proceeds or for the imposition of fines of comparable
3 96
value.
f. Accounting Transparency
In addition to its anti-bribery provisions, the OECD
Convention requires signatories to prohibit, like the SEA, nontransparent accounting practices by taking
such measures as may be necessary, within the framework of its
laws and regulations regarding the maintenance of books and
records, financial statement disclosures, and accounting and

auditing standards, to prohibit the establishment of off-the-books
accounts, the making of off-the-books or inadequately identified
transactions, the recording of non-existing expenditures, the entry
of liabilities with incorrect identification of their object, as well as
the use of false documents, by companies subject to those laws and
regulations, for the purpose of bribing foreign public officials or of
3 97
hiding such bribery.

As with sanctions for violations of the anti-bribery provision,
sanctions for violations of the accounting
provision are to be
"effective, proportionate and dissuasive."3 9 8
g. Mutual Legal Assistance
The mutual legal assistance provision of the Convention is
optimistic, requiring each signatory to
provide prompt and effective legal assistance to another Party for
the purpose of criminal investigations and proceedings brought by
a party concerning offences within the scope of this Convention and
for non-criminal proceedings within the scope of this Convention

393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

Id.
See Commentaries on the Convention, supranote 371, para. 31.
See OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3, art. 3(2).
See id. art. 3(3).
Id. art. 8(1).
Id. art. 8(2).
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brought by a Party against a legal person. The requested Party
shall inform the requesting Party, without delay, of any additional
information or documents needed to support the request for
assistance and, where requested, of the status and outcome of the
399
request for assistance.

In other words, the mutual legal assistance provision
requires the signatories to work together aggressively to search
out bribery of foreign officials and to cooperate in building
criminal cases against offenders.4 0 0 Thus, the signatories are to
assist each other, upon request, by making persons available to
assist in investigations or to participate in proceedings and by
temporarily transferring a person in custody to the requesting
party.4 0 ' The requesting party is to keep the transferred person
in custody and to return the person without requiring formal
40 2
extradition proceedings.
The Convention also explicitly states that a request for
mutual legal assistance may not be declined on the ground that
assistance by a signatory would violate that signatory's bank
secrecy laws.40 3
This provision exemplifies the Convention's
theme of international cooperation to combat bribery by placing
the Convention's goals in supremacy over highly valued domestic
laws.
h. Extradition
The Convention further promoted international cooperation
in combating bribery by making bribery of a foreign public official
an extraditable offense. 40 4 In the absence of extradition treaties
between individual signatories, the OECD Convention suffices as
a legal basis for extradition. 40 5 If a signatory country refuses to
extradite one of its own nationals accused by another signatory of
making a bribe, the refusing signatory must submit the case to
40 6
its own authorities for prosecution.

399.
Id. art. 9(1).
400. The DOJ is particularly encouraged by the mutual legal assistance
provisions of the OECD Convention due to its belief that the provisions will
enhance the DOJ's ability to obtain evidence of violations that occur overseas.
401.
See Commentaries on the Convention, supranote 371, para. 31.
See id.
402.
403.
See OECD Convention on Bribery, supra note 3, art. 9(3).
404.
See id. art. 10(1).
405.
See id. art. 10(2).
406.
See id. art. 10(3).
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i. Closed Loopholes
Two provisions of the Convention attempt to hinder the
parties from circumventing the intent of the Convention. First,
the Convention explicitly states that prosecutorial discretion
"shall not be influenced by considerations of national economic
interest, the potential effect upon relations with another State or
the identity of the natural or legal persons involved." 40 7 Thus,
the Convention mitigates the effectiveness of certain political
excuses a signatory might offer for non-enforcement of its
implementing legislation.
Second, the Convention states that any statute of limitations
applicable to a signatory's implementing legislation must "allow
an adequate period of time for the investigation and prosecution"
Presumably, this provision was enacted to
of an offense. 40 8
prevent a party from establishing a statute of limitations so brief
that it would prevent prosecutors from enforcing the
implementing legislation.
Notwithstanding these attempts to close loopholes, one
notable deficiency of the Convention is its failure to ban explicitly
the tax-deductibility of foreign bribes. Nonetheless, the OECD
has recommended in the past that states cease recognition of
such deductions, and its Committee on Fiscal Affairs is
monitoring bribery tax treatment by its members. 40 9 Moreover,
bribes can no longer stand as legitimate tax deductible items
after implementation of Convention obligations] because
criminalizing a payment surely must proscribe permitting its
deductibility under any tax code. In addition, the Convention
calls for the creation of a program, operating within the context of

407.
OECD Convention on Bribery, supranote 3, art. 5.
408.
Id. art. 6.
409.
See Update on the Implementation of the OECD Recommendation on
the Tax Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Public Officials (visited Nov. 4, 1999)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/noncorruption/tax98.htm>; see also Tax Treatment of
Nov.
4,
1999)
Countries
(visited
in
OECD
Member
Bribes
As of July 30, 1999,
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/taxstatus.htm>.
the OECD Recommendation on bribe deductibility had prompted the following
member states to pass legislation outlawing the practice: Austria, Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, the Netherlands, Norway and Portugal. See
id. Australia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, Sweden, and Switzerland did not have
such laws in effect, but appropriate legislation has been proposed or drafted in
each country. See id. All other OECD member states banned deductions for bribe
payments prior to promulgation of the OECD Recommendation. See id.
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the OECD Working Group on Bribery in International Business
4 10
Transactions, to monitor the Convention's implementation.
B.

MultilateralImplementation4 1 1

Instead of resting on its laurels after adopting the Convention, the OECD has continued to expand its anti-corruption
efforts. In collaboration with the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe, the OECD organized an anti-corruption
conference in July 1998 in Paris that was attended by 175
officials from over thirty-five countries. 4 12 In September 1998,
the OECD, the OAS, Argentina, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) jointly held an anti-corruption
conference in Buenos Aires. 4 13
In October 1998, the OECD
coordinated with USAID and the Turkish International Cooperation Agency to present a three-day anti-corruption in
4 14
Istanbul attended by eighty-five leaders from twenty countries.
Simultaneous with these efforts to enlarge the group of nations
fighting corruption, the OECD continued to propel implementation of the Convention by its signatories.
1. Current Status of Member Legislation
Although it took about four years for the OECD to pass the
Convention
after
the
OECD
adopted
an
anti-bribery
Recommendation, 4 1 5 ratification and implementation by the

410.
See OECD Convention on Bribery, supra note 3, art. 12. The DOJ
believes the monitoring program will toughen anti-bribery legislation enacted by
the signatory countries.
411. Many of the countries participating in the OECD Convention must
extensively alter current laws or introduce new legislation to implement the
Convention. For example, the mutual assistance provisions of the Convention
specifically state that bank secrecy is not a valid reason to deny enforcement
assistance, which runs head-on with the legal culture of one signatory in
particular, Switzerland.
412. See OECD-OSCE Conference Executive Summary, National and
International Approaches to Improve Integrity and Transparency in Government:
Executive Summary (visited Oct. 5,
1999) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
nocorruption/parisum.htm>.
413. See OECD, Buenos Aires Workshop; Combating Bribery in International
Business Transactions in Latin America (visited Oct.
5,
1999)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/argcon.htm>.
414
See OECD, Istanbul Workshop; Combating Corruption in Transition
Economies: Executive Summary (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.oecd.
org/daf/nocorruption/istcon.htm>.
415.
Summary of OECD Anti-Bribery Convention, INT'L L. NEWS 10 (Winter
1998).
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individual signatories is progressing rapidly.
This section
describes the steps already taken and the expected actions by
each participant to ratify and implement the OECD Convention
4 16
as of the publication of this article.
Argentina. The Spanish text of the Convention has been
finalized and inter-ministerial consultations on the amendments
to -heArgentine Penal Code are complete. The draft bills to ratify
and implement the Convention was submitted to the Legal and
Technical Secretariat of the Presidency. The bill will soon be
submitted to Parliament which is expected to deliberate on the
4 17
issue in early 2000.
Australia. The Australian Federal Parliament tabled draft
legislation to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials in
international business transactions on March 3, 1998.418 The
legislation and the Convention were referred to the Joint Standing
Committee on Treaties for examination. 4 19 The Committee on
Treaties tabled its report on July 2, 1998, and recommended that
Australia sign the Convention and enact implementing legislation
with a few minor amendments. 4 20 A federal election interrupted
the process of implementing the Convention, but Australia signed
the Convention on December 7, 1998.421
Implementing
legislation was passed by the Parliament and received Royal
Assent on June 17, 1999. The instrument of ratification was
deposited with the OECD Secretariat on October 18, 1999, and
the implementing legislation will come into effect on December
18, 1999.422

416. The following descriptions of the status of implementation in each
signatory country are based on information released piecemeal by the OECD. See
Steps Taken and Planned FutureActions by each ParticipatingCountry to Ratify and

Implement the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business
Transactions (last
modified
Oct.
6,
1999)
<http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/annex2.htm> [hereinafter Steps]. Some
countries have also posted their implementing legislation on the Internet. The

OECD has created a website that provides links to the various postings. See Links
to National Implementing Legislation (last modified Sept. 14, 1999)
<http://wwx.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/linksl.htm> [hereinafter Links].
417.
See Steps, supranote 416, at Argentina.
418.
See Commonwealth of Australia-ParliamentaryDebates (Mar. 3, 1998)
<http://wvwv.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/dalys/ds3O398.pdf> at 226.
419.
See Steps, supra note 416, at Australia.
420.
See Commonwealth of Australia-ParliamentaryDebates (July 2, 1998)
<http://www.aph.au/hansard/senate/dailys/ds20798.pdf> at 4678.
421.
See Criminal Code Amendment-Explanatory Memorandum 2 (visited
Oct. 28, 1999) <http://www.aph.gov.au/parlinfo/billsnet/6es201.pdf>.
422.
A violator of the Australian law could be imprisoned for ten years. Of
particular interest, the current draft of the Australian bill provides a detailed
explanatory chart of the types of conduct that would be lawful under its
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Austria. Austria's implementing legislation entered into force
in Austria on October 1, 1998.423
The First Chamber of
Parliament passed the bill on March 24, 1999.424 The Second
Chamber Committee declined to veto the bill on April 13, 1999,
the ratification process was finalized, and the ratification
instrument was deposited with the OECD Secretariat on May 24,
1999.425
Belgium. Ratification and implementation of the Convention
is a two-step process in Belgium. The ratification bill was adopted
by Parliament on April 22, 1999, and it received royal sanction on

June 9, 1999. The instrument of ratification was deposited with
the OECD Secretariat on July 23, 1999. With respect to the
implementation of the Convention, the legislative proposal to
revise the penal law was passed by Parliament at the beginning of
February 1999, was published on March 23, 1999, and entered
into force on April 3, 1999.426
Brazil. A draft text has been sent to the Brazilian Congress
by the executive branch of government and is under examination
by the Chamber of Deputies. 42 7 The ratification process should
be completed this year. Internally, bribery is covered by a law
passed by the Brazilian Congress in March 1998 that outlaws
money laundering and related crimes and usage of financial
systems for illicit purposes. 4 28 Among other things, the law
establishes the Council on Financial Activities Control. 4 2 9
Bulgaria. Bulgaria ratified the Convention on June 3, 1998
and deposited its ratification instrument on December 22,
1998.430 Parliament passed a Law on Amendment to the Penal
Code on January 15, 1999, which entered into force on January
29, 1999. 4 31
An explanation of "foreign public official" in
compliance with the Convention was incorporated into the Penal
432
Code.

implementing legislation.

The bill also would shift the burden of proof to

defendants pleading a 'facilitating payment" defense.

Criminal Code Amendment

(Bribery of Foreign Public Officials) Bill

<http://www.aph.gov.au/

1999,

par1info/bi1lsnet/bi11s.htm>. Under the FCPA, the prosecution bears the burden
of showing
423.
424.
425.
426.
427.
428.
429
430.
431.
432.

that a payment was not a facilitating payment.
See Steps, supra note 416, at Australia.
See id.
See id.
See id. at Belgium.
See id. at Brazil.
See Link, supranote 416, at Brazil (English version).
See id.
See Steps, supranote 416, at Bulgaria.
See id.
See id.
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Canada. The Senate adopted the new legislation on
December 3, 1998, and the House adopted it on December 7,
1998. 4 33 The legislation received royal assent on December 10,
1998 and was ratified a week later on December 17. 4 3 4 The law
entered into force on February 14, 1999. 4 35
Chile. The
draft
legislation
for
ratification
and
implementation of the Convention was presented to the Chamber
of Deputies on January 5, 1999 to inform the Commission for
External Relations. 43 6 Parliament is expected to approve the bill
following the Presidential election in December 1999, and
ratification is expected to occur in early 2000.
Czech Republic. The Criminal Code amendment was adopted
by Parliament and entered into force on July 1, 1999. Parliament
currently is considering the draft ratification law, which is
4 7
expected to be approved by the beginning of 2000. 3
Denmark. Denmark has prepared its draft ratification and
implementation legislation. The government submitted the draft
legislation to Parliament in the spring of 1999 and re-submitted it
to Parliament in October 1999. The legislation was scheduled to
undergo its first parliamentary reading on October 27, 1999.
Adoption and entry into force of the legislation was expected to
occur by the end of 1999.438
Finland. The legislation for ratification and implementation
was approved by Parliament on October 9, 1998, and the
ratification was deposited on December 10, 1998. 4 3 9
The
amended Penal Code entered into force on January 1, 1999. 44o
According to a Presidential Decree issued February 5, 1999, the

Convention entered into force internally on February 15, 1999. 44 1

433.

See id. at Canada.

434.

See id.

435. The Canadian law imposes greater penalties on recipients of unlawful
payments and those who assist the recipient in concealing or converting the payments than it does on those who make the payments. The "supply side," or givers
of payments, may be imprisoned for only five years. Corruption of Foreign
Officials Act, R.S.C. ch. 34, § 3(2) (1999) (Can.). The "demand side," or recipients
and launderers of payments, may be imprisoned for ten years if an "indictable
offense" action is brought or may be imprisoned for six years and fined $50,000 if
a "summary conviction" action is brought. Id. at §§ 4(2), 5(2). According to the
Canadian Department of Justice, there is no limit to the fines that could be imposed on corporations. Highlights of the Corruptionof Foreign Public Officials Act,
<http://canada/justice.gc.ca/news/communiques/1999/corback/5Fen.html>.
436.
See Steps, supranote 416, at Chile.
437.
See id. at Czech Republic.
438.
See id. at Denmark.
439.
See id. at Finland.
440.
See id.
441.
See id.
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France. The Council of Ministers approved the draft
legislation after consideration by the State Council. 44 2 It then
submitted the ratification and implementing legislation to
Parliament, which adopted the ratification law on May 25, 1999.
The ratification was to be submitted to the Senate on November
44
10, 1999 and to the National Assembly on December 14, 1999.

3

Germany. Germany ratified the Convention on November 10,
The Act on Combating International Bribery, containing
Germany's implementing legislation, was passed on September
15, 1998 and entered into force on February 15, 1999 with the
44 5
Convention.
Greece. Greece's Parliament ratified the Convention on
November 5, 1998, and passed the implementing legislation on
the same day. 4 4 6 Greece deposited its ratification instrument on
1998.44

February 5, 1999. 44 7
Hungary. The ratification and implementing legislation to
amend the Hungarian Criminal Code was submitted to
The ratification legislation was
parliament in May 1998.
approved on December 4, 1998 and Hungary deposited its
instrument of ratification on that date. The amendment of the
Criminal Code was passed in December 1998 and entered into
force on March 1, 1999. 44 8

442.
443.

See id. at France.
See id.; see also Le Journal Official: Loiset Decrets (visited Oct. 9,

1999) <http://www.Iegifrance.gouv.fr/citoyen/actualite/preparation/corruption.
htm>.
See Steps, supranote 416, at Germany.
444.
445.
See id. The German law clarifies that judges and soldiers are "foreign
officials" within the meaning of the Convention. See Act on Combating Bribery of
Foreign Public Officials In International Business Transactions (Sept. 9, 1997)
<http://vvw.oecd.org/daf/noncorruption/pdf/actga.pdf>. Germany's implementing
legislation provides for punishment by fine or imprisonment not exceeding five years.
See id at art. 2, §2(l).
446.
See Steps, supranote 416, at Greece.
See id.
447.
448.
See id. at Hungary. This provision in Hungary's implementing
See
legislation, appears to directly contradict the intent of the Convention.
Commentaries on the Convention, supra note 371, para. 3. Like the Canadian
law, the Hungarian law punishes perpetrators on the supply and demand side of
corrupt transactions. See Crimes Against the Purity of Public Life §§ 250-53
<http://www.oecd.org//daf/nocorruption/pdf/hunlaw.pdf>. Of particular interest
is Hungary's broad assertion of jurisdiction over certain corrupt "acts committed
by non-Hungarian citizens abroad[.]" Id. § 4 (emphasis added). Also notable is a
potential loophole in the Hungarian law. A violator of the law's anti-bribery
provisions is excused from punishment if he conferred a payment or favor upon
the official out of a fear that otherwise he would be paced at an unlawful
disadvantage. Id. § 258/B. If the official engages in extortion as a matter of
course, however, the briber could truthfully argue that she would have been
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Iceland. Iceland deposited its instrument of ratification on
August 17, 1998 and Parliament passed the implementing
legislation on December 22, 1998. 44 9
Ireland. The draft legislation for ratification of the
Convention has been approved. However, further legislation in
one or two areas is required to make Irish law entirely in accord
In May 1999, the Convention was
with the Convention.
presented to the Dail. The Prevention of Corruption Bill was
expected to be published in late 1999.450
Italy. The Chamber of Deputies approved the bill for
ratification on March 24, 1999.451 The Senate is expected to pass
the bill in the near future. Amendment of Italian law to provide
for non-criminal sanctions is a new feature for the legal system.
A provision providing for non-criminal sanctions of Euro 1.5
million are expected to be introduced within six months of final
4 52
approval of the bill.
Japan. On April 10, 1998, Japan formally submitted to the
National Diet the Convention and its implementing legislation in
amendment of the Unfair Competition Prevention Law. The
National Diet approved the Convention on May 22, 1998. 45 3 The
implementing legislation was adopted on September 18, 1998,
and the instrument of acceptance was deposited on October 13,
1998. 4 5 4 The Japanese law will impose fines of as much as 300
million yen on Japanese corporations that violate the
implementing law, and individuals can be assessed fines of three
4 SS
million yen.
Korea. Korea formally submitted the bill to ratify the
Convention along with its implementing legislation to the National
Assembly in October 1998. Both bills were quickly approved by
the National Assembly on December 17, 1998, and Korea
S
deposited its instrument of ratification on January 4, 1999.4 6

unlawfully disadvantaged had he elected not to make payment. Thus, her actions
would be excused. This bizarre result eludes the spirit of the law but is one that

follows from a reasonable reading of the law.
See id. at Iceland.
449.
See id. at Ireland.
450.
See id. at Italy.
451.
See id.
452.
See id. at Japan.
453.
See id.
454.
455. Japan to Amend Law on Bribery to Conform With OECD Agreement, INT'L
TRADE REP., Apr. 8, 1998, at 604.
See Steps, supranote 416, at Korea.
456.
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The implementing legislation went into effect on February 15,
1999. 457
Luxembourg. The Counseil D'Etat was expected to ratify and
implement the Convention by the end of October 1999. The
legislative process was expected to be complete by early 2000.458
Mexico. The Mexican Senate approved the OECD Convention
as an international treaty on April 22, 1999. Both Chambers in
Congress approved the implementing legislation in late April. The
Mexican instrument of ratification was deposited with the OECD
4
Secretariat on May 27, 1999.

9

Netherlands. Bills to ratify and implement the Convention
were sent to Parliament in April 1998.460 Three EU treaties were
simultaneously submitted. Ratification of the Convention by the
Kingdom of the Netherlands is complicated because Aruba and
the Netherlands Antilles participate in the process and must
461
approve the law before Parliament does.
New Zealand. Implementing legislation was submitted to the
Parliament in September 1999. November elections delayed
deliberation on the legislation which will be discussed when the
Parliament reconvenes in 2000. Passage of the implementing
4 62
legislation is expected shortly thereafter.

457. See id. Korean law now provides that an individual violator may be
imprisoned for five years or fined 20 million won or twice the amount of the profit
obtained by the illicit act if the profit exceeds 10 million won. See Act on
PreventingBribery of ForeignPublic Officials in InternationalBusiness Transactions,
(Dec. 17, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/noncorruption/pdf/korea.pdf> at art.
3(l). If the convicted payor made the payment in relation to business for a legal
entity, the entity may be fined 1 billion won. See id. at art. 4. The legal entity will
not be subject to sanctions, however, if it exercised proper supervision over the
guilty representative. See id.
458. See Steps, supranote 416, at Luxembourg.
459. See id. at Mexico.
460.
See id. at Netherlands.
461.
See id.
462.
See Steps, supra note 416, at New Zealand. New Zealand's draft
legislation is noteworthy in its reference to "tainted property," which is defined as

the proceeds of a violation or property used to commit the violation. See Relevant
New Zealand Legislations (last modified Sept. 14, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/
daf/noncorruption/pdf/nzlaw.pdf>, app. 3.6, §2.
In addition to imposing
imprisonment and fines upon a convicted party, the government could also seek
forfeiture of all "tainted property." See id. Perhaps indicative of its status as an
island-nation, New Zealand's legislation also contains a detailed jurisdictional
section with regard to corruption crimes committed on ships or aircraft outside of
its territory, which includes assertions of jurisdiction over British and Irish
citizens. See id. app. 5.1, § 8(1). Also noteworthy is the bill's requirement that
prosecution under the law can not occur without approval of the AttorneyGeneral, and in cases of prosecution against a judge, only after a resolution of the
House of Representatives. See id. app. 4. 1, § 1.
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Norway. At the end of May 1998, Norway completed its
consultation with relevant private and public parties and
legislation to
and implementation
submitted ratification
Parliament. The amendments to the Penal Code were passed on
October 27, 1998 and entered into force on January 1, 1999.
The instrument of ratification was deposited on December 18,
1998.463
Poland. Bills for implementing and ratification legislation
were drafted separately. The ratification bill was to be forwarded
to the Parliament in November 1999 if no objections were voiced
by the Council of Ministers. The implementing legislation was to
be submitted to the Prime Minister in November 1999 for final
arbitration. If the Prime Minister settled the matter, both bills
were to be forwarded to Parliament by the end of 1999.464
Portugal. The ratification procedure was nearly completed in
October 1999, with the Convention under review by specialized
committees of Parliament. The competent authorities within the
Ministry of Justice are finalizing the draft of the implementing
legislation that would amend current criminal law. 4 65 A copy of
the draft legislation is to be provided to the OECD as soon as it is
publicly available.
Slovak Republic. The Parliament approved ratification of the
Convention on February 11, 1999, and the implementing
The
legislation entered into force on September 1, 1999.
instrument of ratification was deposited with the OECD
6
Secretariat on September 24, 1999.46
Spain. The draft ratification legislation was submitted to
Parliament in the fall of 1998 as approved by the Council of
Ministers. The Parliament subsequently gave permission to ratify
the Convention. A draft implementing text was approved by the
Council of Ministers on January 29, 1999 after review by the
The draft text of the implementing
General Law Council.
legislation was submitted to the Parliament for examination
46 7
during the fall 1999 session.
Sweden. The ratification and implementing legislation was
passed by Parliament on March 25, 1999. The instrument of
ratification was deposited with the OECD on June 8, 1999. The

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.

See Steps, supranote 416, at Norway.
See id. at Poland.
See id. at Portugal.
See id.
See id. at Spain
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implementing
legislation was entered into force on July 1,
46
1999.

8

Switzerland. The larger Chamber of Parliament debated draft
ratifications and implementing legislation on October 7, 1999.
The smaller chamber of Parliament was scheduled to debate the
legislation in December 1999, and the law was expected to enter
into force in early 2000. Ratification of the Convention was also
expected to occur in early 2000.469
Turkey. The draft ratification bill has been submitted to
Parliament. Inter-ministerial consultations on the implementing
text are completed as well, and a draft implementation bill is
4 70
expected shortly.
United Kingdom. The United Kingdom deposited its
instrument of ratification on December 14, 1998. Although
internal consultations have confirmed that current U.K. law
complies with the Convention, formulation of a new public
statute on corruption is under consideration. A public discussion
on proposals for new corruption legislation likely will be
published prior to Parliament's summer recess. 47 1
Additionally, steps are being taken to bring the Channel
Isles, the Isle of Man, and U.K. Overseas Territories within the
scope of the Convention, which will require new legislation. 4 7 2
The territories will adhere to the Convention through ratification
of U.K. law and not by individual ratification of the Convention.
On March 17, 1998, a White Paper was published titled
"Partnership for Progress," which expressed a desire for Overseas
Territories to comply with relevant financial regulations and to
meet all international standards that apply to money laundering,
transparency, and cooperation with enforcement authorities by
the end of 1999. 4 7 3

United States. On July 31, 1998, the Senate approved the
Convention and the implementing legislation. 4 74
Congress
completed action on the implementing legislation in October
1998, and on November 10, 1998 the President signed both the
ratification instrument and the implementing legislation. The
instrument of ratification was deposited on December 8, 1998. 47 5

468.
See id. at Sweden.
469.
See id. at Switzerland.
470.
See id. at Turkey.
471.
See id. at United Kingdom.
472.
See id.
473.
See id.
474.
See id. at United States.
475. The FCPA was amended to redefine "foreign official" to include officials
of public international organizations, to make it unlawful to make payments for
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2. Implementation and Enforcement

a. Implementation Review
Despite the great strides that the transparency-ingovernment movement has taken in recent years, reformers seek
to enjoy similar success with other perceived problem areas.
Efforts are underway to expand the list of signatories to the
OECD Convention, 4 7 6 to create an anti-corruption agreement for
Africa, 4 77 to pursue similar objections in Asia,4 7 8 to counteract

the use of offshore financial centers to circumvent prohibitions on

bribery, 4 7 9 to promulgate laws that outlaw private commercial

any "improper advantage," and to broaden the jurisdiction of the law.
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366,
112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
For example, Israel recently requested to join the Convention. OECD
476.
Examines Offshore FinancialResorts in Anti-Bribery Drive, INSIDE U.S. TRADE, Feb.
26, 1999, at 24.
477.
See Stuart E. Eizenstat, An Anti-Corruption& Good Governance Strategyfor
the 21st Century-Addressat the Global Forum on Fighting Corruptionand Safeguarding
Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials, (Feb. 24, 1999) <http://www.usia.gov/
topical/econ/integrity/document/eizen.htm> (describing recent African Ministerial
Declaration on corruption and public accountability issued by leaders from eleven
African nations).
Over 1600 delegates from 135 countries attended the ninth
International Anti-Corruption Conference in Duban, South Africa in Fall 1999. AntiCorruption Conference Ends uth Call for InternationalMechanisms to Recover Looted
Money (visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/pressreleases/ 1999/1999.10. 15.durbancommitment.html>. The Conference adopted a
resolution calling for international conventions to impede money laundering and to
help developing countries recover funds looted by corrupt leaders. See id. The host
country of the Conference, South Africa, announced that it soon would become a
party to the OECD Convention. See id.
478.
The OECD and the Asian Development Bank sponsored a conference
on combatting corruption in Asian and Pacific economies in Manila from
September 29 to October 1, 1999. OECD Anti-Corruption Unit, Outreach (visited
More
Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/outreach.htm>.
than 200 participants from 36 countries attended the workshop, which was
convened to raise awareness of corruption issues and to identify effective anticorruption strategies. See id.
479.
See OECD Begins Study of Compliance With Anti-Corruption Treaty
Outlawing Bribery, DAILY REP. FOR ExECUTIVES., Apr. 28, 1999, at A-6; OECD
Examines Offshore Financial Resorts in Anti-Bribery Drive, supra note 447; Daley
Vows to Expand Fight Against Corruption (January 19, 1999) <http://www.usia.
gov/topical/econ/integrity/newsl.htm> (speech to Transparency International by
U.S. Commerce Secretary William Daley).
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48
corruption, 4 80 to ban bribes related to foreign political activity, '
and to eliminate the tax deductibility of bribes made in the course
4 82
of business, where applicable.
As momentum for enhanced anti-bribery regulation bills,
there are those who warn of the danger of over-legislation and
under-enforcement. 48 3 They assert that the next steps taken
should be those that effect the goals of the Convention itself,
rather than those that promulgate new ideas and inspirational
rhetoric.
While it seems an obvious point, ratification and
implementation by the signatories will be-or should be-the
current primary focus. By late October 1999, sixteen of the
48 4
thirty-four signatories still had not ratified the Convention.

Among those failing to ratify the Convention were France, Italy,
and the Netherlands,
representing a substantial portion of OECD
485
exports.
The OECD will review the anti-corruption regime of each
signatory to ensure that it complies with the Convention and that
it coheres with the regimes of the other parties to Convention.
Pursuant to its review procedure, the OECD examined Germany,
Norway and the United States in April 1999 and intended to
evaluate Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Greece, and Korea in July
1999.486 The OECD hopes to examine all signatories by the

480.
See, e.g., Johnston, supra note 322 ("The OECD Convention goes very
far to protect international public procurement from corruption.... But does it
make sense to stop there?").
481.
See Eizenstat, supra note 477 (explaining that the U.S. seeks to expand
Convention to cover bribery of foreign political parties, party officials, and
candidates for public office); Daley Vows to Expand FightAgainst Corruption,supra
note 479.
482.
See Daley Vows to Expand Fight Against Corruption, supra note 479
(noting that several OECD countries still permit this practice); see also Nora M.
Rubin, supra note 366, at 289 (colorfully observing that until recently "If a
German bribes a German, he gets thrown in jail; if he bribes a foreign official, he
gets a tax deduction.").
483.
See, e.g., Nancy Dunne, US PressesDrive Against Business Bribery, FIN.
TlMEs (London), Feb. 24, 1999, at 7 (observing that the DOJ failed to bring a single
prosecution between 1994 and 1996 when U.S. businesses assumedly engaged in
at least some level of corruption); Daniel Kaufman, Challenges in the Next Stage of
Anti-corruption, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON COMBATING CORRUPTION 139, 156-57 (1998)
("concrete and informed action" preferable to corruption conferences and
academic papers).
484.
See Steps, supranote 416.
485.
See Andrew J. Pincus, Presentation at the Global Forum on Fighting

Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials (Feb.
25, 1999) (notes of speech as prepared for delivery on file with authors). Pincus is
General Counsel for the U.S. Department of Commerce.
486.
See OECD Anti-Corruption Unit, Launching of the MonitoringProcedure
(visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/nocorruption/whatsnew.htm>.
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spring of 2000 in order to produce a comprehensive progress
48 7
report.
The review process is broken into two different time
periods. 48 8 The principal objective of Phase I, scheduled to last
from 1999 to April 2000, is to evaluate whether the implementing
legal texts of the various signatories meet the requirements of the
Convention. 48 9 Phase I involves elements of self- and mutualevaluation whereby each signatory responds to an OECD
questionnaire. Once the OECD asks follow-up questions, the
signatory has an opportunity to supplement its original
answers. 4 90 Finally, during formal examination by the OECD, a
country can make an initial short presentation of its approach to
fighting corruption. 4 9 1 Business and civil society groups are not
invited to participate in the formal evaluation process of
4 92
signatories.
Phase II has only been outlined at this point, but its stated
purpose is to study and assess the enforcement structures in
place. 4 9 3 Phase II is scheduled to be finished by 2005, and its
structure is similar to that of Phase J. 4 9 4 A questionnaire will be
issued, a provisional report on country performance will be
drafted, the OECD will consult with individual signatories, and a
4 95
final report will be adopted.
b. Enforcement
The day-to-day battles against international business
corruption will be fought with several different weapons.
Sophisticated diagnostic surveys are being used to assess the
value of corruption costs in private or public business. 496

487.
See id.
488. The review process is described on the OECD website. OECD AntiCorruption Unit, Procedureof Self and Mutual Evaluation of Implementation of the
Convention and the Revised Recommendation (1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/
nocorruption/selfe.htm>.
489.
See id.
490.
See id. The U.S. responses to the questionnaire and supplemental
questions can be found at <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/firstqu.
htm> and <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/suppleme.htm>.
491.
See id.
492.
See id.
493.
See id.
494.
See id.
495.
See id.
496.
See Eizenstat, supra note 477.
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Progress against corruption in Albania, Georgia, and Latvia has
497
been attributed to the use of these diagnostics.
The United Nations, and entities supported or sponsored by
the United Nations, also will exert pressure in support of anticorruption initiatives. For example, a recent report on human
development in South Asia, partially funded by the U.N.
Development Program, called for a "bold, concrete anti-corruption
agenda" in the face of damaging and pervasive corruption in
South Asia (including Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Nepal). 4 98 The report called for independent audits of government
procurement action, separate "corruption courts," disclosure
requirements audits of government procurement action, separate
"corruption courts," disclosure requirements regarding the assets
of public officials, and transparent procurement laws. 4 99 Indeed,
the report was prescient in that the military of one south Asian
nation, Pakistan, used high-level corruption as justification for

overthrowing the civilian government.
Economic and lending institutions also limit corruption.
Economic policy changes that would reduce the power held by
public officials may thereby diminish the bargaining power of the
"demand-side" of bribery. 50 0
For example, the incentives to
accept bribes may be reduced if tariffs and other trade barriers
are lowered, market-determined exchange and interest rates are
unified, licensing requirements are lessened, monopolies are
eliminated, and barriers to entry for new entrepreneurs are
discarded. s o '
More significantly, intelligence agencies will engage in an
increasing amount of anti-corruption work. The U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the National Security Agency (NSA)
both have taken a more active role in economic affairs recently,
collecting data related to international contracts.5 0 2
The

497.
Daniel Kaufman et al., New Frontiers in Diagnosing and Combating
Corruption,PREMNOTES (The World Bank: Oct. 1998).
498.
Mahbub ul Haq, 1999 Report on Human Development, Human
Development Center. The report stated that the widespread corruption of South
Asia had several invidious effects. Namely, corruption reduced the availability of
basis social services and had increased their costs, attenuated the rule of law,
distorted decisionmaking on development programs, and encouraged the flight of
desparately-needed capital. See Report: Corruption in South Asia Dangerous,DAILY
YOMIURI, Nov. 3, 1999, at 8.

499.
500.

Report: Corruptionin South Asia Dangerous,supranote 498, at 8.
See Cheryl W. Gray & Daniel Kaufman, Corruption and Development,

FIN. & DEV. Mar. 1998, at 10.

501.
Id.
502.
See Simpson, supranote 8, at A3. See James Bamford, Loud and Clear:
The Most Secret of Secret Agencies Operates Under Outdated Laws, WASH. POST,
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implication is that the U.S. intelligence community is
substantially involved in monitoring corruption and its effects on
bidding by U.S. companies under the premise that corruption
that directly harms U.S. economic interests and competitiveness
indirectly threatens U.S. national security interests.

U.S. FCPA

enforcement efforts rely heavily on classified3 documents and
50
government sources that will not be revealed.
Labeled the "secret weapon" in the

fight

against

corruption, 50 4 the Internet already has contributed greatly to the

transparency movement. s

s

Nothing eliminates corruption like

access to information, and that is exactly what the Internet
In fact, the U.S. Vice President's office recently
provides.
that
an Internet-based reporting device be implemented
proposed
to enhance the mutual evaluation process among countries
50 6
As more
attempting to work together to combat bribery.
governments become openly involved in anti-corruption efforts
and cloak-and-dagger agencies like the CIA attempt to expose
bribery, the risk of liability to violators, and those innocently
associated with violators, dramatically increases. Amid the spread
of mechanisms to prevent or expose corruption, reducing the risk
50 7
of liability becomes ever more important.

Nov. 14, 1999, at B1 (discussing concerns regarding the NSA's ability "to extend
its eavesdropping network almost without limits" and concerns among some U.S.
allies that the NSA "may have turned from eavesdropping on the communists to
eavesdropping on businesses and private citizens in Europe and the United
States"); see also CIA's Ignominious Role in Economic Espionage, S.F. CHRON., Feb.
2, 1997, at 10 ("CIA sources said [economic] spying is routine[.]").
503. Telephone conversation of author with source at DOC General
Counsel's office (around March 3, 1998).
504. Albert Gore, Keynote Address at the Global Forum on FightingCorruption
and Safeguarding Integrity Among Justice and Security Officials. (Feb. 24, 1999)
<http://xww.usia.gov/topical/econ/integrity/document/gore.htm>.
505. The citations to this article provide ample evidence that the best and
most comprehensive source of information about anti-corruption efforts around
the globe is found on the Internet. Indeed, two anti-corruption websites have

been created to serve as fora for disclosure and discussion of transparency
problems and issues. See Anti-Corruption Network for Transition Economies
(visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.nobribes.org> (anti-corruption forum focusing
on eastern Europe and states of the former Soviet Union); Respondent (visited
Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.respondanet.com> (Spanish language anti-corruption
forum focusing on the Americas with link to English version).
506.
See Gore, supra note 504. While the Internet may be extremely useful
in western nations such as those that comprise the OECD, its efficacy in lesserdeveloped nations as a tool against corruption remains to be seen.
507. OECD Convention violations were recently exposed in South Africa and
Lesotho, where several major international construction companies allegedly
bribed the chief executive officer of the $150 million Lesotho Highlands Water
Project with $2.5 million in payments. E. Ogoso Opolot, InternationalFirms in SA
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IV. REDUCING LIABILITY-COMPLIANCE MEASURES

In modern business it is not the crook who is to be feared most; it is the
honest man who doesn't know what he is doing.
-

Owen D. Young

We call on corporations to adopt effective anti-corruption programmes.
-

Peter Eigen

s o8

S0 9

The FCPA has profoundly affected U.S. corporate culture,
and it is expected that the OECD Convention will similarly
influence corporate activity in the OECD member states.
Although the U.S. government has brought fewer than thirty
cases under the FCPA anti-bribery provisions since their
enactment, the severe penalties of the FCPA have served as
ample motivation for U.S. companies to take measures to ensure
that they adhere to the law.
Increased enforcement and
escalation of penalties in the 1990s-best exemplified by the $59
million paid by General Electric pursuant to a plea bargaingreatly increase the importance of compliance with anti-bribery
law. In addition to fines, individuals involved in misconduct have
been sentenced to lengthy periods of incarceration, and
companies can suffer collateral sanctions such as debarment and
suspension from procurement activities. The summary of FCPA
enforcement actions provided supra in Part II.B illustrates how
the severity of FCPA penalties, the cost of defense efforts, and the
negative publicity resulting from charges of violations steer
companies toward plea agreements instead of toward mounting a
full defense. Although some targeted companies are ultimately
acquitted, the strain, cost, and embarrassment incurred in

Bribery Scandal, EAST AFRICAN, Aug. 17, 1999 (visited Nov. 5, 1999) <http://www.
africanews.org/south/southafrica/stories/ 19990817Jeat18html>. The project
was originally awarded to a Chinese firm but that contract was terminated due to
alleged bribers of Ugandan officials that totaled almost thirty percent of the
contract money. See id. The accused firms are from Canada, Italy, France,
Germany, and Switzerland-all parties to the OECD Convention. See id.
508. Attributed in Quotes to Inspire You at <http://cyber-nation.com/
victory/quotations/authors/quotes.young.owend.htm>. Time magazine named
Owen D. Young, American lawyer and financier, its 1929 Man of the Year for his
leadership in the post-World War I Second Reparations Conference.
509. Transparency International, New Poll Shows Many Leading Exporters
Using Bribes (visited Nov. 15, 1999) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/
cpi/cpi-bpi_press-release.htm>.
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mounting a defense serve as adequate incentives to implement
5 10
the best compliance program possible.
Knowing how to comply with anti-bribery law, particularly
within the ever-expanding international regime, is no simple task.
Using the FCPA once again as an example, there is only limited
guidance on compliance with the twenty-year-old statute. No
implementing regulations exist, and there is almost no applicable
case law. When the FCPA was amended in 1988, the DOJ was
instructed to solicit comments from other agencies and the public
and to determine whether it should issue compliance
guidelines. 5 1 ' After the required consultation, however, the DOJ
determined that guidelines were unnecessary.5 12
Thus,
practitioners and others seeking to comply with the FCPA have
been relegated to reading legal tea leaves. The DOJ and the
Department of Commerce issued an FCPA brochure in 1992 that
is self-described as only a "general description."5 13 Although the
DOJ has a formal opinion procedure, 5 14 little more than thirty
issue analyses have been placed in the public domain since
1980.515 Furthermore, these few DOJ opinions do not function
as binding precedent and are strictly limited to the facts of the
transactions at issue. Even if DOJ opinions could be relied upon
as precedent, their utility would be limited because the DOJ
rarely explains its reasoning for authorizing a transaction. The
DOJ generally recites the facts and its conclusion with no further
explanation. There is even less information regarding the future

510.
If the costs created by a simple allegation of wrongdoing are not
adequate incentive to institute a compliance program, at least one more potential
benefit of a compliance program is worth noting.
The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines provide that the existence of an effective compliance program can
reduce the liability of a convicted party, regardless of the program's failure to
prevent the pertinent violation.
FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL,

§ 8c2.5(f) (1999).
511.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(e).
512.
55 Fed. Reg. 28,694 (1990).
513.
See United States Department of Justice Fraud Section, Criminal
Division & United States Department of Commerce Office of the Chief Counsel for
International Commerce, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions
(visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://wwv.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/dojdoc.htm>;
<http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/fcparev.html>.
514.
Companies can request a DOJ opinion regarding the legality of
prospective transactions under 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(e) and 28 C.F.R. § 80.
515.
See Department of Justice, FCPA Review Procedure Releases,
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/revindx.htm> (DOJ opinions issued
between 1980 and 1992); Department of Justice, FCPA Opinion Releases,
<http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/opiindx.htm> (DOJ opinions issued
between 1993 and 1998).
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of the

OECD

countries.
Notwithstanding
the lack
of compliance
standards
established by enforcement authorities, the vast majority of
multinational U.S. companies has developed and implemented
FCPA compliance programs, and these programs can serve as
models for other companies currently establishing their own
compliance mechanisms. The widespread adoption of compliance
programs has created expectations on the part of enforcement
authorities that companies will have them in place.
While
compliance programs vary in scope and detail among different
corporations, they all are intended to establish procedures that
are reasonably expected to prevent and detect violations of the
FCPA. These so-called "due diligence" procedures are crucial to
the institution of a corporate "culture of compliance" that will
help protect the company from FCPA violations and any
accompanying penalties.5 16 Moreover, in the event of a violation
and detection by enforcement authorities, due diligence serves as
a defense by establishing that the company acted reasonably,
used best efforts to prevent the violation, and did not have
517
knowledge of wrongdoing.
Any compliance program should be tailored to the individual
needs and potential degree of exposure of each company.
Although foreign bribery is commonly associated with government
procurement,
a
compliance
program
should
cover all
international corporate activity because the OECD Convention,
like the FCPA, in fact applies to all international transactions,
including investments, purchases,
and sales.
Foreign
multinational corporations now under the OECD Convention
regime should borrow extensively from the FCPA compliance
programs adopted by U.S. companies that generally include some
or all of the following elements.
A. CorporatePolicy Statement
The creation of a compliance program starts with a clear
statement that corporate policy is to adhere strictly to the

516.

H. Lowell Brown, Parent-SubsidiaryLiability Under the Foreign Corrupt

PracticesAct, 50 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, 39 (1998).

517. The exercise of "due diligence" in preventing an FCPA violation is not a
statutory defense. See H.R. CONF. REP. ON H.R. 3, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 916, 922
(1988) (rejecting explicitly a "due diligence" exception). Nevertheless, the adoption
of due diligence measures create a de facto defense, in that the company should
not be held liable for the unlawful acts of employees or intermediaries when the
company has no reason to know of those acts.
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To create a
mandates of all applicable anti-bribery laws.
corporate "culture of compliance," 5 18 however, a company must
go beyond the mere issuance of a statement from a lawyer hidden
away in a corporate office. Rather, company leadership must
endorse the anti-bribery corporate policy from the chief executive
officer through all levels of management. Failure by management
to voice its support for the policy may create the misimpression
and that the stated antithat non-compliance will be 5tolerated
19
bribery policy is a hollow one.
Corporate policy statements normally are incorporated into a
general manual of a company or a company code of business
conduct. Anti-bribery policy provisions can range from short and
Using the FCPA and its
general, to lengthy and detailed.
applicability to a U.S. company as the template, a simple policy
statement might read as follows:
The Company is committed to ensuring that its global
business operations are conducted lawfully and
honestly and are free from the influence of corruption.
In furtherance of this objective, all Company
managers are expected to make Foreign Corrupt
Practices ActS20 compliance a priority, and all
Company employees are expected to comply with the
U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 52 1 and the
Company's Code of Business Conduct. Accordingly,
no payments of money, gifts, services, entertainment,
or anything of value may be offered or made available
in any amount, directly or indirectly, to any
government official or employee in any country where

such payments are illegal or not customary.

Such

payments are not legal in the United States, 52 2 and
should not be made in other countries, even if legal
there, if they are in violation of U.S. 5 23 laws,
regardless of the nationality of the recipient. If there
52 4
is any question as to the applicability of the U.S.
laws to a particular transaction or arrangement, the

518.
See Brown, supra note 516, at 40 (listing steps necessary to establish a
"culture of compliance").

519.
520.
legislation
521.
522.
523.
524.

Id. at 43-45.
Or, for a foreign corporation, the OECD Convention implementing
of the applicable jurisdiction.
See id.
Or, in the jurisdiction to which the corporation is subject.
See id.
See id.
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legal department must be contacted. The Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act 5 2 S imposes severe penalties for
failure to follow these policies.
Longer policy statements may provide greater detail
regarding the elements of an anti-bribery law violation and of the
controls instituted by the company. s2 6 Regardless of their
complexity, however, the most important functions of policy
statements are to ensure that (1) relevant company personnel are
sensitive to the general requirements of the law, and (2) personnel
know to refer any potential bribery law questions to company
experts, usually the legal department.
Some U.S. company compliance programs exceed FCPA
requirements by forbidding payments or bribes to private-sector,
non-governmental parties in normal commercial transactions.
Such policies often are adopted formally in compliance with U.S.
laws governing "commercial bribery," discussed previously in Part
II.A.2.c. An illustrative policy statement to this effect might read
as follows:
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act by its terms is
limited to payments to government officials. However,
the Company policy exceeds FCPA requirements and
prohibits any similar questionable payments to any
5 27
party for any reason.
The policy statement also may refer to the narrow exception
and limited defenses of the FCPA, that is, "facilitating" payments
to government officials for the performance of routine duties,
payments permitted by local law, and certain limited business
expenses. Because of the narrowness of these exceptions, any

reference to them should require advance approval by the legal

525. Or, the OECD Convention implementing legislation of the applicable
jurisdiction.
526. A "whistleblower" policy might also be added to the policy statement
whereby the company affirms that it will protect from retribution any person who
reports an anti-bribery law violation.
527. A real-life example of such language is provided by United Technologies
Corporation, which maintains an FCPA website on its intra-net service. The
website states in relevant part: "These pages address only the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act. The UTC Code of Ethics contains a much broader prohibition on
the payment of bribes. A payment that is not prohibited under the Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act may well be prohibited by UTC's Code of Ethics."
(access
<http://www.corphq.utc.com/emhand/BPO/brochures/corrindex.html>
restricted) (on file with authors). The same website describes the FCPA, explains
its elements, and provides phone numbers for employees to call if they suspect a
bribe has been or will be made or offered.
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department or another suitable office within the company. If
coverage of commercial bribery is included within the policy
statement, the statement also may refer to broader exceptions for
entertainment of private individuals.
Although it was not subject to the FCPA or the OECD
Convention at the time, a Danish consulting firm drafted a "Gifts
Policy" in 1995 that exemplifies a detailed policy statement. 5 23
The policy first states a general principle that visible gifts are
considered normal business practice while invisible gifts are
Under the policy, gifts of company
considered bribes.
paraphernalia, such as ties, pens, and umbrellas, are
Also permissible are gifts of reasonably priced
encouraged.
flowers, wine, or dinner invitations if a specific reason for the gift
is stated on the bill.
The Danish firm appears to have drafted the "Gift Policy" in
imitation of the FCPA's delineation between large gifts and
"facilitating" payments.s i 9 The policy lists examples of invisible,
improper gifts, such as presents worth more than US $200, direct
cash presents, cash presents made through an intermediary, and
secret "employment" of non-employees. 5 3 0 Like the FCPA, the
Danish policy provides an exception. Unofficial fees paid to carry
out necessary day-to-day duties in connection with contracted
work are permissible if the payor attaches a note to the expense
claim detailing the efforts made to avoid payment of the fee. Even
with the note, however, company staff review the propriety of the
S3 1
payment as a further screening measure.
B. Accounting Procedures
As discussed supra, the FCPA prohibits bribery and requires
companies to implement accounting controls to ensure that their
records are accurate, transparent, and properly retained. Thus,
many U.S. companies incorporate some reference to the FCPA
accounting provisions in their compliance programs, particularly

528. Transparency International, Applying the Framework The Private-Corporate
Sector, in THE TI SOURCE BOOK (visited Oct. 5, 1999) <http://www.transparency.
de/documents/sourcebook/b/Chapteri13/index.html>.
See generally discussion of FCPA exceptions, supra notes 39-40 and
529.
accompanying text.
See Transparency International, supranote 509.
530.
The efforts of the Danish firm provide evidentiary support for
531.
Denmark's reputation as the least corrupt country in the world. Transparency
The Corruption Perceptions Index (visited Oct. 5, 1999)
International,
<http: //www.transparency.de/documents/sourcebook/b/Chapter_ 13/index.html>.
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focusing on hidden, inaccurate, incomplete, misleading or false
entries. Of course, in the absence of the FCPA's accounting
requirements, multinational companies
still would have
important reasons to ensure the accuracy of their records. An
example of a policy statement regarding accounting practices,
with reference to the FCPA, follows.
The Company's business records must always be
prepared accurately and reliably and stored properly.
All transactions must be reflected on the company's
books, records and accounts, as must all other events
that are the subject of a specific regulatory recordkeeping requirement. No undisclosed or unrecorded
funds or assets of the company or its subsidiaries
shall be established for any purpose. No false or
artificial entries shall be made in any company books
or records for any reasons.
No payment shall be

approved or made with the intention or understanding
that it is to be used for any purpose forbidden under
the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act s 3 2 or this corporate
policy.
Any employee having any information or
knowledge of a hidden fund or asset, or any false or
artificial entry, or any inappropriate payment, must
inform the legal department.
Records must be
retained in accordance with the company's record
retention and destruction policy and may never be
destroyed to avoid disclosure in a legal proceeding.
Any questions regarding the treatment of records
should be referred to the legal department.
Because many companies already possess transparent
accounting policies to comply with various domestic laws, they
need only amend those policies to include references to specific
language of the FCPA or any other applicable OECD Convention
implementing law.

532.
Or, the OECD Convention implementing legislation of the applicable
jurisdiction.
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C. The Human Element

1. Personnel Compliance

a. Training
A fundamental feature of every effective compliance program
is a requirement that employees understand the applicable legal
requirements and the requisite procedures to ensure conformity
with the law. Accordingly, employees should be provided with
information on the law that is drafted in layman's terms.
Compliance information should be communicated through the
corporate policy manual, company website, lunchroom posters,
and periodic memoranda or other publications. Senior
management should participate in the communication of this
information to validate the importance of compliance.
Employees should be provided a toll-free telephone number
or hotline that they can call to report misconduct or suspicious
activity or to raise questions about proposed actions that may
implicate anti-bribery law. It is probable that most companies
already have toll-free numbers or hotlines in place for other
reporting purposes that may either be modified or expanded to
accommodate
calls regarding
potential anti-bribery law
violations.5 3 3 The company may accept calls anonymously and
should maintain a log of all calls received. Once the substance of
a call is transmitted to the appropriate company official, a
decision can be made regarding how to pursue the matter. The
original caller, if not anonymous, should be contacted and
53 4
advised of the results of the investigation.
Additionally, relevant personnel should be encouraged to
attend periodic seminars or workshops on anti-bribery law
compliance. For these purposes, "relevant personne includes,
in particular, those who work with foreign government agencies
or officials, those who are directly involved with foreign agents,
consultants, distributors, or investment partners, and in-house
counsel.

533.
For example, "If you have a question or concern about a payment made
to a foreign official, press '7' now."
534.
See Brown, supra note 516, at 50.
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b. Verification
Some U.S. companies implement additional protective
measures to ensure compliance with the FCPA.
The most
common additional control employed by companies is a

requirement that personnel involved in transactions connected to
foreign governments or agents execute a periodic certification that

they have not violated the FCPA.
A common method of
"compliance affirmation" is a requirement that employees
involved in international operations annually attest in writing
that they have acted in a manner consistent with the company's
anti-bribery policy and the requirements of the FCPA. The
company may require additional attestations prior to the
commencement of a major transaction or at the culmination of
complex and competitive negotiations.
One benefit of the
attestation requirement is that it motivates employees to ensure
they are familiar with FCPA requirements. Such an affirmation
may read as follows:
I,
, hereby certify that I have read and
understand the Company's business policy for
complying with the U.S. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
and further certify that during the twelve-month
period ending

I have not paid or given

anything of value, either directly or through third
parties, to an official of a foreign government, officer of
a political party, or candidate for political office, or
official of an international organization, for the
purpose of influencing an act or decision to assist in
obtaining or retaining business for the Company, or
for any improper advantage, and I have no reason to
believe that anyone else has done so. I further attest
that I have no knowledge of any fund within the
corporation that was created or maintained, or from
which expenditures have been made, for purposes
other than those reflected on the books and records of
the Company.
Like the corporate policy, the attestation should be tailored to
employ the precise language of any applicable implementing
legislation under the OECD Convention.
c. Other Controls
Two other controls employed by some companies are worth
briefly mentioning. The first control is a company policy that its
independent auditor will perform procedures specifically designed
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to assess whether payments or transactions have occurred that
may be questionable under the FCPA. The second control is
integration of compliance with law and corporate policy as a
factor to be weighed in personnel review. Personnel may be
tempted to believe that disregard or circumvention of law or
corporate policy is permissible if they believe that the law or
policy impedes the success of the business. Thus, any tendency
of personnel to ignore anti-bribery policy can be limited if
compliance with bribery policy, and company policy in general, is
an element of performance measurement and resultant
5 35
compensation.
2. Third Party Compliance
The most difficult aspect of OECD Convention compliance
will derive from the fact that a company may not indirectly bribe
government officials by knowingly making payments through
third party intermediaries. The summary of FCPA enforcement
actions in Part II.B. demonstrates that companies sometimes are
held liable for violations by subsidiaries and for unlawful
payments made through sales agents. Third party intermediaries
can include agents, sales or marketing representatives,
and joint venture partners.5 3 7
consultants, distributors,5 3 6
Thus, transactions
and arrangements
with state-owned
enterprises are particularly risky.
As previously stated, the "knowledge" standard of the FCPA
is broad, encompassing actual knowledge as well as instances
where there is a "high probability" that an intermediary will
undertake prohibited conduct or where a company "deliberately"
or "consciously" avoids knowledge of the intermediary's violative
acts. The "knowledge" standard effectively requires a company to
take reasonable "due diligence" measures to ensure that
payments to third parties do not result in FCPA violations and to

535.
See id. at 45 (discussing the integration of compliance into
performance criteria).
536.
Although a typical distributor arrangement does not involve direct
payment to a distributor, a company nevertheless can be held liable under the
FCPA if it provides excessive price discounts or rebates to a distributor in
exchange for bribes to foreign officials.
537.
An overseas joint venture, or an affiliate or subsidiary, generally is
deemed an agent of a parent if the parent controls subsidiary voting, there are
officers or directors common to both entities, and the venture or subsidiary is
financially dependent upon the parent. Where the parent has only a noncontrolling or a minority interest in the venture or affiliate, the parent
nevertheless should protect itself by requesting compliance with anti-bribery rules
and by documenting such efforts.
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prevent the company from being deemed "knowingly" involved in
any misconduct by its intermediaries. It is unclear how broadly
the members of the OECD will interpret "knowledge" in their
enforcement efforts, but it would behoove companies now subject
to the OECD Convention to implement some set of due diligence
measures.
The FCPA itself provides little guidance regarding the
required "due diligence," but its legislative history and
subsequent administrative pronouncements are instructive.
These sources demonstrate that those subject to the FCPA should
employ great care in their selection of overseas business partners,
should obtain assurances that the third party will not make a
prohibited payment, and should monitor the third party activities
where possible and appropriate. These key features of thirdparty due diligence procedures are separately examined below.
a. Screening
Because multinational companies are potentially liable for
the corrupt acts of a third party, many companies include in their
compliance programs a multi-tiered screening process of all
overseas intermediaries. 5 3 8 First, a company collects background
information on a prospective intermediary, including the
intermediary's experience and references, its government
affiliations, and its corporate structure and financial status.
Such information typically is acquired through questionnaires,
interviews, and investigations. Once the information is collected,
a company must assess whether the intermediary presents an
Some companies
unacceptable risk of an FCPA violation.
routinely require a formal analysis of candidate's to enhance the
standardization of the process, to ensure that the necessary
information is collected, and to select the intermediary on a
competitive basis.
i. Identifying Candidates and Qualifications
Identifiable and objective qualifications are a prerequisite to
a screening process because the purposes of the process are to
select an intermediary that is capable of conducting company
business and simultaneously to create a paper trail in support of
the final decision. Full documentation of legitimate business
reasons for selection of an intermediary helps insulate a company

538.

For purposes of the following discussion, "intermediary" is used in

reference to any agent, representative, consultant, partner, or employee.
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from liability under the FCPA because it shows the justifiability of
the decision.
Although there are an infinite number of possible
qualifications to seek in an intermediary, several should hold
These include: (1) a
priority in the majority of selections.
reputation as an ethical businessperson; (2) financial stability,
which may be established by longevity in the area; (3) an
understanding of the applicable laws, trade-related and
business custom; and (5) ability
otherwise; (4) knowledge of local
53 9
to grow with the business.
Once qualifications are in place, a company must identify a
pool of candidates from which to choose the intermediary. A
company that already has a presence in the foreign market will
be aware of who to consider or, in the alternative, whom to
contact to obtain referrals. If the company has no contacts in the
foreign market, however, it must locate a neutral source, if
Some companies are
possible, to provide it with referrals.
assisted by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, which has branches
in most foreign countries. The U.S. Chamber of Commerce
maintains rolls of foreign business contacts and will, in some
cases, introduce a company to a potential intermediary. If the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce has only a weak presence in a region,
it can steer a company to a private consultant who can identify
candidates.
fl. Questionnaires
The best way to kick-start research of candidates is to obtain
A
background information from the candidates themselves.
standard questionnaire is an effective tool to get information that
a company can use to further investigate a candidate and that
can be used to compare the candidate's responses with the
responses of other candidates.
Most companies already have some sort of employment
questionnaire. For purposes of bribery law, the questionnaire

Even if no anti-bribery law existed, these qualifications probably would
539.
top a list of sought-after qualifications in a foreign intermediary, if only for
In the context of anti-bribery law, however, they also
business reasons.
demonstrate an ability to conduct overseas business the "right" way without being
forced to resort to bribery or other improper payments.
In typical domestic business dealings, one might also search for a candidate
with access to government officials and inside information. While this may be the
case in the establishment of any legitimate business relationship, it is probably
prudent to avoid listing these among the roster of qualifications for a foreign
intermediary.
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should be based on the qualifications the company has
determined are important and should also seek to elicit
information that is relevant to the law. Thus, in addition to
standard business questions, 5 4° the questionnaire should
request the following information: (1) a roster of the full names of
all officers and employees of the candidate; (2) a listing of all
governmental or political positions held by any officer or
employee of the candidate; (3) a listing of all governmental or
political positions held by any relative of any officer or employee
of the candidate; (4) a comprehensive listing of all of the
candidate's business affiliations, including subsidiaries or total or
partial ownership of any other enterprise; and (5) pointed
questions regarding possible benefits of the business relationship
accruing to any governmental or political official. The same types
of questions must be asked of a non-company, individual
candidate.
iii. Interviews
Once the questionnaires are submitted and reviewed, the
candidate pool can be reduced to those warranting an interview.
Interviews, of course, should address the subject matter of the
questionnaire and should probe its strengths and weaknesses. A
special advantage of the interview is its ability to give the
company a sense of the candidate's personality and veracity.
After the interview, a formal memorandum recording the
conversation and the interviewer's impressions should be drafted
and submitted to the final decisionmaker.
iv. Investigation
While information provided by the candidates is helpful, it is
by no means the end of due diligence screening. The company
should seek to verify the candidate's offerings through its own
investigation. Thus, local governmental bodies can be contacted
to verify biographical and business information.
Business
associates of the candidate should be contacted, including, but
not limited to, the references provided on the questionnaire.
Internet and other on-line services should be utilized to provide
other background information.

540. These questions would address financial statements, banking
references, general references, facilities information, qualifications/training in the
relevant business, experience, and business plans.
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If the candidate is a large company or a prominent
individual, the U.S. Department of Commerce may be able to
provide information either through its "International Company
Profiles" or through the assistance of desk officers specializing in

the candidate's country.

Other governmental entities may be

contacted, such as U.S. embassies or Department of State desk
officers, and private commercial firms such as Dun & Bradstreet
Full
may have reference material concerning the candidate.
documentation of all investigative efforts should be placed in the
candidate's file.

v. Legal Analysis
If the candidate is a foreign company, legal due diligence
must be conducted to verify that the company is in compliance
with the hiring party's local law, including the OECD Convention
implementing legislation. If the investigation demonstrates that
no foreign official is involved in any manner in the proposed
business relationship, little legal analysis is required. However,
full legal documentation must occur if a foreign official or political
actor, or a company owned in part by such a person, is involved.
While the OECD Convention does not prohibit hiring a
"foreign official," the relationship between the payments and the
official's position determines the propriety of the payments. The
greater the rank of an official, particularly if there is an
established link between the official's responsibilities and the
payment's intent, the greater the likelihood of a violation.
Because it is sometimes difficult to discern whether or not a
government or government official is involved in a foreign
company, any doubts should be resolved with written legal
opinions stating the reasons why the relationship is proper and
repeating the legitimate bitsiness reasons for pursuing the
relationship.
A full review also should be conducted of the law of the
foreign country (even if the country is not party to the OECD
Convention), probably through consultation with local counsel.
In addition to researching all foreign law that addresses bribery of
public officials, legal research should also address local agency
law, government procurement law, labor law, the law of thirdparty beneficiaries, and tax law. Specific questions to ask may
include whether the country prohibits or regulates the use of
intermediaries, prohibits payment of a commission in government
procurement, when intermediaries can be hired and fired, and
how intermediaries must be registered.
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vi. Selection
Once all information is accumulated, the company's hiring
personnel must review and compare the files of the candidates.
Of course, business considerations generally play the largest role
in selecting an intermediary. To assure compliance with the
FCPA and other anti-bribery law, however, certain types of
information are considered "red flags," or signs that the
intermediary might intend to make a prohibited payment, which
warrant further review and possible disqualification of a
candidate. "Red flags" arise when a candidate's file results in a
54 1
"yes" answer to any of the following questions:
(1)
(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

541.

whether prohibited payments are commonplace or
5 42
traditional in the country in question;
whether the reputation of, or prior experience with, the
intermediary suggests the possibility of prohibited
payments;
whether
the intermediary's
proposed
level
of
compensation is abnormally high either as a
percentage or in absolute terms;
whether the intermediary is unwilling to provide
certifications to the effect that it has not and will not
make a prohibited payment;
whether the intermediary has an affiliation or close
relationship with a foreign government or any of its
relevant officers;

See Department of Justice, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery

Provisions (visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/
dojdocb.htm>.
542.
While the DOJ stresses the importance of this factor, it does not

maintain a list of high-risk countries.
The Corruption Perceptions Index
published by Transparency International may be the most reliable source in
analyzing this factor.
For explanation of the contents of the Corruption
Perceptions Index, see supranotes 347-49 and accompanying text. It is important
to note, however, that the Corruption Perceptions Index does not rank every
country in which transactions may occur. Furthermore, a high or low ranking on
the Index should not be considered dispositive of a transaction; further due
diligence surrounding a country should be conducted.
What makes the "corrupt country" factor unique is that it is not transactionspecific. Therefore, the only way to avoid the danger imposed by this factor is to
refuse to do business in a country that has a bad reputation. Withdrawal from a
country is not required, as demonstrated by the legislative history of the FCPA
which states that the "mere fact of doing business in a country where corrupt
payments are common" is not, alone, violative of the FCPA. S. REP. No. 100-85, at
52 (1988).
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(6) whether the proposed payment to the intermediary

would be made in an abnormal or concealed fashion,
such as in cash, or through a third country bank
account;
(7) whether there is an absence of bona fide business
reasons for retaining the intermediary;
(8) whether there are other circumstances that could later
be viewed as suggesting the intermediary might make
inappropriate payments, such as indications that a
payment is to be earmarked for a government official
when made to the intermediary, or whether the
intermediary holds itself out as having special access
or otherwise suggests some correlation between
payment to the intermediary and government access or
influence of government decisions.
No single factor is determinative in establishing whether a
company should conclude that a prospective intermediary is a
risk of a violation of the applicable OECD Convention
implementing
legislation;
all
facts
and circumstances
surrounding the retention of the intermediary must be considered
together.
b. Contract
Compliance programs also may require that the written
contract with the intermediary contain a provision acknowledging
the intermediary's adherence to the pertinent anti-bribery law,
and the company's anti-bribery policies. Such a contractual
provision might read as follows:
represents and agrees that (i) it will not pay

or give anything of value, directly or indirectly or
through third parties, to an official of a foreign
government, officer of any political party, candidate for
any political office, or official of an international
organization for the purpose of influencing an act or
decision in their official capacity, or inducing them to
use their influence with the foreign government to
assist in obtaining or retaining business for or with, or
directing business to, or providing some other
economic benefit to the Company or for any unlawful
purpose; (ii) none of
's directors, officers,
major shareholders, or employees are officers or
representatives of any government or political party,
candidates for any political parties, or officials of any
international organizations; (iii) full disclosure of the
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existence and terms of this agreement may be made at
any time to whomever the Company's counsel

determines has a legitimate need to know such terms;
(iv) all compensation and expense reimbursements to
will
are subject to audit; and (v)
immediately notify the Company in the event any of
__
_'s directors, officers, major shareholders, or
employees should become governmental officials,
candidates or appointees for any government office,
officers of any political party, or officials in any
international organization, or in the event such
government officials, candidates, party officers, or
officials of an international organization should
become directors, major shareholders or employees of
Similar provisions can be used for arrangements with
subsidiaries, joint venture partners, and contractors.
There is no set of standard, minimum, or maximum
contractual provisions.5 43 What is reasonable depends upon the
individual intermediary. The more indicia of an intermediary's
inclination to make a prohibited payment, the more specific and
comprehensive the contractual undertadngs of the intermediary
should be. In such a case, the company should consider the
following additional provisos for inclusion in the contract:
(1) the intermediary will provide an opinion from local
counsel acknowledging that local law permits the
relationship or transaction in question;
(2) the intermediary covenants to maintain accurate,
complete, and transparent accounting;
(3) the company has the right to terminate the

relationship

if

the

intermediary

breaches

any

covenants, or if a change in circumstances enhances
544
the likelihood of a violation;

543.
For example, another prophylactic measure employed by many
compliance programs is a certification requirement whereby the overseas
intermediary executes a certification or other assurance that it has not, and will
not, make a prohibited payment. Certifications of compliance often are required
on a set schedule and may be patterned after those required of employees, as
discussed supra.
544. A company's commitment to abiding by anti-bribery law may be
questioned absent a contractual provision for a remedy.
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(4) the intermediary covenants to indemnify the company
for any and all damages arising from the
5 45
intermediary's breach;
(5) all payments will be made by check or wire transfer
and will be made directly to the intermediary; cash
payments will not occur and neither will payment to a
third party;
(6) no rights or obligations of the intermediary may be

assigned or delegated to a third party;
(7) the company reserves the right to perform random
compliance audits of intermediaries;
(8) travel and entertainment expenses will be paid only after
company approval and thorough documentation.
A company has little day-to-day control over the actions of a
foreign intermediary; the extent of possible hands-on monitoring
is extremely limited. However, individualized tailoring of
contracts between a company and a foreign intermediary, by
including any or all of the provisions suggested above,
demonstrates that a company has made substantial efforts to
comply with all applicable anti-bribery law.
c. Controls
Once a relationship with an intermediary has begun, a
company can protect itself further by employing certain
procedural safeguards. For instance, a company may permit its
foreign intermediary to forward invoices from agents only if they
contain a complete description of the services rendered and may
stipulate that the invoices will be compared with the terms of the
agreement under which the services are performed. Similarly, it
may be advisable to stipulate that payment for the agent's
services will be made directly by check to the agent or her
account in a financial institution in the country in which the
services are being performed. Further, a company can ensure

that payments never will be made to entities that did not provide
services or to numbered accounts in third countries.
Such
measures make it more difficult for an agent to avoid recognition
of the appropriate compensation.

545. In practice, indemnity may be difficult to obtain from a foreign party,
but an indemnification clause may act as a deterrent to malfeasance and serves
as another indication of the company's dedication to compliance.
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d. Monitoring
Many compliance programs provide that, even after a foreign
representative is retained, the company will continue to monitor
her activities. Monitoring is important because a company can be
held liable for unlawful acts of long-time, previously reliable
agents. Monitoring can prevent a company from being surprised
when a private sector agent becomes affiliated with a government
after it is retained by the company.
If a company suspects that a representative has made a
prohibited payment, it is incumbent upon the company to
investigate the matter and, if necessary, to terminate the
relationship. After there is reason to believe that a foreign
intermediary has made or will make a prohibited payment, any
payment to that intermediary could be viewed as a violation of the
applicable anti-bribery law. The company also must determine
how and why the prohibited payment was made and must then
fine-tune its compliance efforts to avoid recurrence of the
violation.
Compliance programs also may impose other internal
controls in addition to third-party screening and assurance
In particular, the following requirements
requirements.
commonly are added as components of a third-party compliance
program: (1) all agreements with overseas intermediaries must
be reduced to writing and must contain a certification as
discussed above; (2) payments to intermediaries may not be made
in cash or to third country bank accounts; and (3) independent
auditors have special instructions and permission to examine
dealings with overseas intermediaries.
Identical concerns attach to investments in foreign affiliates,
such as subsidiaries and joint ventures; similar "due diligence"
measures, therefore, are common in dealings with these entities.
In particular, a company may seek appropriate written
certifications from relevant foreign partners or employees that
they comply with all pertinent bribery laws. A company entering
a joint venture may require its foreign partner to certify (1) that
no corrupt payments were made to "foreign officials" in
connection with entering into or securing necessary approvals for
the relationship; (2) that its participation in the transaction is
permitted by local law; (3) that no portion of the proceeds paid by
the concerned company into the venture will be used to fund
payments in connection with securing government approvals; and

1999]

GLOBALIZATION OFANTI-BRIBERY MEASURES

1343

(4) that the foreign partner's books and records are accurate and
complete. The company also can require that the affiliate or joint
the
venture partner adopt an anti-corruption policy, including
5 46
intermediaries.
third-party
screening
for
above measures

V. CONCLUSION
He who profits illicitly troubles his own house, but he who hates
bribes will live.
-

Proverbs15.27647

U.S. companies subject to the unilateral prohibitions of the
FCPA have long complained that they were losing contracts
because of bribery by non-U.S. competitors, and that the futility
of complaining coupled with concerns about retribution by
officials who were recipients of the bribes, left them without
recourse. With the adoption of the OECD Convention,
multinational companies who have evidence that they lost
business because of competitor bribery will be more likely to
complain directly to prosecutors in the competitor's home
country, with recourse to their own governments, the OECD
Working Group, and the press, if the prosecutors fail to take
action. Some will act as private attorneys general, aggressively
rooting out evidence of competitors' bribery, using the Convention
as a tool to right perceived competitive imbalances.
The U.S. government has committed its considerable
diplomatic and intelligence resources to enforcing the OECD
Convention, and is under domestic political pressure to follow
through. The U.S. State Department will ensure that regular
comprehensive reviews of the adequacy of enforcement efforts by
Convention members occur, and it will monitor cases prosecuted
by members.5 48 A U.S. Undersecretary of State asserted that

546. A final concern regarding the retention of third-party affiliates is the
possible application of local law restrictions on the hiring, payment, and
termination of intermediaries. For example, in the Middle East and Latin America
there are restrictions on the use of sales agents and on the termination of
Similar restrictions apply in some
agreements with sales intermediaries.
European and Asian countries. Thus, many multinational corporations factor
these constraints into their screening of third-party intermediaries.
547. Proverbs 15:27 (New American Standard Bible).
Delegation of Responsibility Under the Senate Resolution of Advice and
548.
Consent to Ratification of the Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions, Memo. of June 10, 1999, 64 Fed.
Reg. 32,795 (1999).
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there now are "very substantial" risks for OECD companies
549
"tempted to acquiesce in the payment of bribes."
The
OECD
also will perform regular reviews
of
implementation and enforcement of Convention obligations that
also will be closely monitored by anti-bribery groups such as
Transparency International.5 5 0
Further, international lending
institutions will exercise greater vigilance against possible bribery
in connection with projects in developing countries.
Given the dramatically expanded international legal
framework prohibiting bribery of foreign officials and the
increased likelihood that prosecution will be sought and publicly
supported, it is incumbent upon multinational companies to
implement compliance measures. A compliance program can be
tailored to the specific circumstances and needs of an individual
corporation, but in most instances, it would be advisable for the
program to adopt in some fashion the fundamental elements
discussed in Part IV. The first element is a corporate policy that
the company is committed to adhering to the requirements of the
local anti-bribery law implementing the OECD Convention. Other
elements entail internal procedures to ensure that personnel
involved with foreign governments or agents are well-informed of
the anti-bribery prohibitions and the compliance measures they
must adhere to, and that accurate accounting records are
maintained and retained.
The final element establishes
procedures that will ensure that relations with third party
intermediaries are monitored and controlled to the fullest extent
practicable.
Earnest implementation of anti-bribery compliance measures
should insulate multinational corporations from liability under
the OECD Convention and related national laws. It also will help
developing countries improve their processes for procuring much
needed goods and services, and may add a measure of civility and
ethics to the often rough-and-tumble atmosphere of international
government procurement competition.

549. Stuart E. Eizenstat, Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, June 9, 1998 (visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.senate.gov/
-foreign/stat.htm>.
550. See discussion of OECD review procedure, supra notes 486-95 and
accompanying text.

